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ABSTRACT
In this work the suitability of different methods of symmetric key distribution for appli-
cation in wireless sensor networks are discussed. Each method is considered in terms of
its security implications for the network. It is concluded that an asymmetric scheme is the
optimum choice for key distribution. In particular, Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC)
is proposed as the most suitable of the various asymmetric approaches. A protocol for
key distribution using identity based Non-Interactive Key Distribution Scheme (NIKDS)
and Identity-Based Signature (IBS) scheme is presented. The protocol is analysed on the
ARM920T processor and measurements were taken for the run time and energy of its
components parts. It was found that the Tate pairing component of the NIKDS consumes
significants amounts of energy, and so it should be ported to hardware. An accelerator
was implemented in 65nm Complementary Metal Oxide Silicon (CMOS) technology and
area, timing and energy figures have been obtained for the design. Initial results indi-
cate that a hardware implementation of IBC would meet the strict energy constraint of a
wireless sensor network node.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks: A new sensing paradigm
The doubling of transistors per unit area every eighteen months, according to Moore’s law
[68], has meant that the processing power of computers has increased greatly in the last
few decades whilst their overall cost has decreased. This trend also makes it possible to
provide on a die, which has area of the order of mm2, enough computational power for a
device to perform a meaningful function [45]. Low energy Complementary Metal Oxide
Silicon (CMOS) radio [31] and Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) sensors, as
demonstrated by Akustica [3], can also be manufactured using a standard CMOS process
that also benefits from this shrinking of technology.
These developments mean that, in the near future, devices will be designed and built
that have digital processing, a radio and a MEMS sensor incorporated on a single device
or System on a Chip (SoC), known as a wireless sensor node, that is manufactured using a
standard CMOS process. This device could potentially cost less than one dollar - Berkeley
[45] has already demonstrated that this cost is possible for a SoC containing a Central
Processing Unit (CPU), hardware accelerators and a radio. To date several platforms [44]
have been proposed for devices that do not incorporate the sensor sub-system.
The sensors that can be deployed on these devices are transducers for detecting phys-
ical phenomena such as light, temperature, magnetic fields etc.. Also, chemical [42] and
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biological sensors can be incorporated into the device using MEMS technology and lab-
on-a-chip systems.
The small form factor, low cost, long lifetimes and wireless connectivity of the wire-
less sensor nodes opens the way to new applications for sensing technology, and also to
much greater spatial density of sensors than can be achieved using conventional sensing
technology. A network of these devices is known as a wireless sensor network (WSN).
It could be envisaged in the future that wireless sensor nodes would be ubiquitous in our
environment; interacting with end users and traditional networks in a seamless fashion;
leading to a union between the physical world we inhabit and the digital world.
An overview of wireless sensors is given in several sources [76, 4, 22, 66, 45, 19, 30,
25]. The common characteristics that they all attribute to wireless sensor nodes are that
they are cost very little and do not need their power source replaced or are self-powered
with multi-year lifetimes typically envisaged on a single power source. The total energy
in the power source for the wireless sensor node is typically considered to be of the order
of 1000 J [45] and should have a power dissipation figure of 100 µW [76]. The network
itself must be self-configuring and robust to individual wireless sensor node failure.
Application areas for WSNs, as can be seen in Section 1.2, are diverse. They could
lead to significant advances in healthcare where patients could be continuously monitored
in their own homes or in hospital without the need for health personnel to be physically
present. Road safety and congestion reduction could be greatly helped by creating smart
roads that have embedded wireless sensor nodes. Monitoring of the environment for
harmful substances, such as from a chemical factory or a terrorist attack around important
infrastructure, such as underground stations, could become practical.
This thesis is not directly concerned with these applications. Rather, the focus of this
work is on making sensed data secure in practice - a key enabling technology for many
applications.
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1.2 Application Areas
Even though the computational and sensing ability of an individual node may be quite
limited, the aggregated effect of all the sensors working together would be to provide a
more accurate global picture of the spatial region in which the sensors are placed than
could be achieved through conventional sensing technology. This opens up a whole vista
of scenarios where sensor networks could be deployed that up until now could not be
considered.
1.2.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is the application of sensing, communication
and control technologies to the road transportation system, with the aim of reducing con-
gestion or improving road user’s safety. It is a field in which wireless sensor networks
could make a valuable contribution [21, 20]. One such approach is described in [20] and
is outlined below.
Four sub-systems make up an ITS; the surveillance sub-system, strategy sub-system,
execution sub-system and communication sub-system. Surveillance is currently carried
out using ultrasonic sensors, video recognition and inductive loops. The communication
sub-system uses a fixed wired network to send the data back to the strategy sub-system
that decides upon the appropriate response. This response is then relayed to the execution
sub-system that can change the traffic lights
In WSN ITS wireless sensor nodes are placed inside the vehicle, at fixed points along
the side of the road and at intersections. The roadside nodes broadcast to the vehicle
wireless sensor nodes and when they receive three such messages they can work out their
position, which is sent back to the roadside devices. Of course, after this has happened
for a second time the device in the vehicle can calculate its velocity. Its position and ve-
locity is then sent to the nearest roadside device, which forwards this information onto the
intersection wireless sensor node that interacts with the strategy sub-system to formulate
an appropriate response, such as changing the lights.
The roadside device uses solar power but it still should consume as little power as
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possible. The maximum power that it uses is 37mW and in the sleep state it consumes
less than 1mW . Security is essential in this system as it would be important that it could
not manipulated to the advantage of an individual driver.
Another use of wireless sensor nodes in ITS would be in traffic speed enforcement.
In the scheme above each vehicle could be issued with a wireless sensor node that would
contain the registration details of the vehicle. In the Republic of Ireland every year new
tax disks are sent out to an owner of a vehicle; this disk could be replaced with a wireless
sensor node. If they are breaking the speed limit then this information could be forwarded
by the wireless sensor network to a base station that sends the information to the authori-
ties.
The cats’ eyes on the road could be developed so that they incorporate wireless sensor
nodes as well. If the devices cost $1 and assuming that the cats’ eyes are 10m apart, then
it would cost $100 per 1km of road to deploy this network. If these cats’ eyes devices
have sensors for detecting temperature, moisture etc. then they would be able to notify
the drivers if there is an upcoming ice patch or other dangerous driving conditions.
In a city environment this wireless sensor network would provide a rich source of
data for traffic managers. It could alert the managers that there is a major traffic jam
on a certain route, and that a detour route is free of traffic. An alert could be issued to
inform drivers travelling in that particular direction to avoid the congested route and take
the detour. This could be introduced as a packet into the network and stored on wireless
sensor nodes just before the detour.
The use of wireless sensor networks in ITS will enable much more data and different
types of data to be incorporated into traffic management systems. There is also a need
for security in the traffic enforcement scenario and also in the general case of information
from wireless sensor nodes being able to contribute to the changing of traffic signals.
1.2.2 Healthcare
There are several projects in the application of wireless sensor nodes to the area of patient
healthcare in emergency medicine [40, 34]. When the paramedics and doctors arrive at
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mass casualty incident they have to classify the injured into critical (red), urgent (yellow)
and minor (green). Following this initial classification they have to monitor the different
patients to ensure that their condition does not deteriorate. If there are a lot of patients
and not very many medical personnel this process would be time consuming and lead to
the doctor having to stop treating a particular patient to check the vital signs of another
patient. John Hopkins University [34] have designed a system, which uses the MicaZ
mote from Crossbow Technology [24] to assist in this process.
Upon arriving at the scene the medical personnel attaches a sensor to the injured and
presses a button on it to indicate the patient’s status - red, yellow or green. This device can
measure their heart rate, blood oxygenation level and blood pressure. It also uses Global
Positioning System (GPS) for locating individuals. The medic interacts with the motes
using a tablet PC and this can be a two way process. When treating another patient then the
medic is kept informed, via the motes, of all the other patients in the area, thus resulting
in better use of his time. There is also a capability for the wireless sensor node to connect
to the Internet via the tablet PC. This enables the patient’s records to be downloaded to
the mote and also for hospitals accepting the casualties to have real time information on
their condition.
Whilst taking the patient’s pulse and oxygenation levels every second, reporting his/her
position every five minutes and also taking blood pressure every fifteen minutes then the
device operates for six hours, which in this case is an appropriate length of time. The
data in the network is secured using an encrypted form of Extensible Markup Language
(XML).
This type of system could also be used in a regular hospital scenario. When a patient
enters hospital they could be issued with a device that has a wireless sensor node em-
bedded in it. This wireless sensor node would be a repository for the patient’s medical
record, and during his time in hospital this would be continually updated as he receives
treatment. Important information such as what drugs the patient should receive whilst in
hospital could be held on the device. All drug containers could be attached with Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags that only have a range of less than a metre. When
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the nurse is administrating the drug, the wireless sensor node could check to see whether
the drug is correct. If it is not, then it sends a message packet to trigger a nearby alarm.
The wireless sensor nodes on the patients could have sensors for measuring heartbeat,
temperature, etc. Any deviation from the norm for these metrics would be sent via other
wireless sensor nodes in the ward back to the nurses’ station. The nurses could also be
alerted to movement of the patients as the their nodes interact with other nodes in the
environment. This could be especially useful in a children’s hospital.
In a healthcare application, security will be crucial to ensure the privacy of the pa-
tient’s medical record. Also, it is not practical to replace batteries every six hours in a
hospital situation so the devices should be designed to consume as little power as possible
to ensure long life.
1.2.3 Environmental Monitoring
Sensors can play an important role in environmental threat detection. Chemical sensors
attached to devices with integrated Radio Frequency (RF) transceivers can provide an
early warning system to rescuers. They provide information on the toxic gas present and
also the position of the contaminant.
The air quality is traditionally monitored by large sensors such as the AreaRAE IAQ
from RAE [78]. The device measures 23.5cm× 13cm× 22.5cm and it weighs 3.9kg. It
has detectors for volatile organic compounds, temperature, humidity, carbon dioxide and
toxic gases. Communication with a base station is achieved using a RF transceiver that
has a range of two miles. It has a integrated GPS device. The device is powered either
by a battery or connected to the mains. When powered by battery it has a lifetime of
twenty-four hours. The price of this device is GB£4000.
The drawbacks of these traditional sensors are obvious. Due to their cost these devices
could not be deployed in large numbers. This means that information that they transmit
back to the base station will provide a very coarse picture on the position of the toxic
gases. They will also have to be incorporated into the mains power supply to ensure that
they operate over a long period of time; further increasing the cost of deployment.
6
Introduction
When CMOS chemical sensors [42] are integrated to form wireless sensor nodes then
this leads to a new approach to monitoring air quality. They could be deployed in large
numbers, as they cost very little, and the cost of deployment of the WSN is negligible
as they are not required to be linked to the mains power supply. The increased density
of sensors leads to an accurate picture of spatial distribution of the toxic chemical and
its concentration. This would help those charged with containment of the chemical to
direct their attention to the source of discharge. Knowing the time and the place where
the chemical was first detected will help the police to catch the perpetrators, as this infor-
mation could be cross referenced with CCTV images to find out who was in the area at a
particular time.
When this WSN is deployed in a counter-terrorism role it is important that the network
is secure. The authorities will not want terrorist to gain control of the network to disable
it or to mount a virtual attack, thus spreading panic.
1.3 Technical Challenges
From the discussion above it should be clear that there are formidable technical chal-
lenges to overcome before this vision of WSNs can become a reality, and some of these
challenges are outlined below.
All of the envisaged applications require cheap sensors networks. The wireless sensor
nodes themselves must cost very little, and this means that the devices must have a small
silicon area to reduce their cost. Of course, this small die area means that memory and
digital computational circuitry will be limited. This constraint places a burden on the chip
designer implementing security on the device, as approaches that consume a lot of die
area cannot be entertained.
In some of application areas of WSN it will not be possible, for reasons of cost or
accessibility, to replace the power source when it is depleted. Conserving energy is vital
for the network to operate as long as possible. The radio will be the main source of power
dissipation in the device, and so should operate with a low duty cycle - less than 1%.
It has been found that in a state of the art radio, the energy required to transmit one bit
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can be dominated by the start-up energy. This is because the packets to be transmitted
are typically very small in wireless sensor networks. The transceiver should be designed
so that the start-up time before the data can be transmitted or received is as small as
possible [92]. The digital circuitry should be designed with the aim of reducing the energy
consumption using well-known techniques (see Section 5.2.1).
It is also important that establishing the network is not an expensive process. It should
be possible for a person who is not an engineer to deploy these networks. Therefore the
WSN has to be self-configuring, and robust to individual device failure. Of course, the
application programming of the wireless sensor nodes would have been carried out by
an engineer but the end user should just be able to scatter the wireless sensor nodes and
expect them to autonomously establish a viable WSN.
A measurement taken from a wireless sensor node consists of three main components;
the physical measurement, the time it was taken and the position of the device. Synchro-
nisation of the devices will be required to get a valid time stamp for the reading. This can
be achieved by the broadcasting of synchronisation packets from a wireless sensor node
within the WSN as there may only be occasional interaction with the gateway device that
injects or extracts data from the WSN. The end users of the system will not be concerned
with a reading from an individual node but rather with the position from which the read-
ing originated. Therefore it is also required that the wireless sensor nodes know their
position, at least relative to one another, and this is a challenging problem (see Section
2.4).
Most of the applications outlined in this thesis (see Section 1.2) require some level
of security: the driver who is speeding will not want this information to become public;
the company that is measuring the pollution that they are creating in the environment will
wish to release that information in a controlled way; the patient in the hospital will want
to be sure that his private medical records remain private. So, in order for these networks
to be deployed in most applications, it is essential that the issue of security is solved,
as noted in [74, 18]. As will be discussed in this thesis, a symmetric key cryptosystem
is appropriate for communication between the wireless sensor nodes in a WSN because
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it has minimal message expansion and so does not greatly increase the number of bits
that have to be transmitted (see Chapter 4). It is also not costly in term of computational
power and hence digital energy dissipation. How the symmetric keys are deployed in the
network however is a challenging problem, and is the main focus of this thesis.
1.4 Research Objectives
The objectives of this research are as follows:
1. Investigate techniques for implementing security in a wireless sensor network. The
approaches should be evaluated in terms of their practicality and energy dissipation.
This investigation will take the form of a technical review of known techniques.
2. Propose a protocol to distribute symmetric keys in the network that could solve
the key distribution problem. Evaluate this protocol in terms of the time and the
energy required to implement it in software. This evaluation will involve running
the software on an ARM platform [5] and measuring the energy consumption.
3. Using the figures from the evaluation of the protocol, develop a hardware architec-
ture for the most computationally demanding element of this protocol and imple-
ment this using a standard cell 65nm library.
4. Validate this work against the software approach in terms of energy and time. The
work should also, as much as is feasible, be validated against the prior art in the
research space.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 – Technical Background
Introduces the devices that are used to establish a WSN and the technical challenges
facing this emerging technology.
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• Chapter 3 – Mathematical Background
The mathematics of Galois field algebra and the Tate pairing are described in detail
to enable a better understanding of later chapters.
• Chapter 4 – Security
The suitability of different methods of key distribution for application in wireless
sensor networks are discussed. Each method is considered in terms of its security
implications for a wireless sensor network. Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC)
is proposed as the most suitable candidate for secure distribution of keys in the
network.
• Chapter 5 – Arithmetic Units
The Galois field arithmetic units that make up the Tate pairing are discussed and
implemented in hardware. Timing and energy figures for the various units are also
presented.
• Chapter 6 – Tate Pairing Accelerator
The overall architecture for the Tate pairing is presented and implemented. Timing
and energy figures for the Tate pairing are presented. These are also compared
against previous implementations and software.
• Chapter 7 – Conclusions & Future Work
A summary of thesis contributions and research objectives attained are presented,
as are plans for future work.
• Appendix A – Algorithmic State Machines for the designs
The Algorithmic State Machine (ASM) diagrams of the circuits discussed in Chap-
ter 5 and Chapter 6 are presented.
• Appendix B – Programmer’s Model
A description of the registers to aid programming of the module.
• Appendix C – Signal Descriptions
The signals that interface with the module are described.
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1.6 Summary
WSNs were introduced in this chapter. Due to their small size, low cost, long lifetime and
wireless connectivity, they could enable a new paradigm of ubiquitous sensing to become
a reality. Barriers between the physical world and digital world could be broken down
and people and machine could interact with the physical world in ways not previously
possible.
The fields in which WSNs might find application are varied and examples are; ITS,
healthcare and environmental monitoring. All of the example applications discussed in
this chapter will need secure networks, though the environmental monitoring example
will need the highest level of security when it is deployed in a counter-terrorism role.
What also differentiates this WSN from the other examples mentioned is that the wireless
sensor nodes have a fixed position and this fact can help secure the network (see Chapter
4). This will be the target application for this work.
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Technical Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter concerns itself with a more in depth look at the technical requirements of the
wireless sensor nodes, and the challenges faced when deploying a WSN.
2.2 Wireless Sensor Node Platforms
There are many different platforms for implementing a WSN [44] but they all share com-
mon characteristics. Figure 2.1 shows a generic wireless sensor node. The key sub-
systems are the sensor, radio and controller. The sensors that are to be integrated with
the device will obviously be application dependent. There has been progress recently in
integrating a MEMS sensor on CMOS using a standard process [3]. To date no group has
integrated all of these key subsystems onto a single die. Communication between wire-
less sensor nodes is achieved using a radio signal. The radio should be designed to have
a small start-up time (see Section 2.5.2) and operate using a low duty cycle. The digital
computation required to run the radio could be implemented in a baseband processor or by
the general purpose processor [43]. This processor also has to control the sensor and read
back values from the Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC). Read Only Memory (ROM)
is required for storing the operating system and applications that are run by the processor.
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Figure 2.1: Architectural overview of a wireless sensor node [19]. The main blocks are
the sensing circuitry, the processor (SA-1100) and the radio.
It also stores the firmware for running the radio baseband processor. As the devices will
spend most of lifetime turned off [45] they must store sensor readings in their persistent
memory as well. Random Access Memory (RAM) will be needed for program execution.
Energy will generally be provided to the wireless sensor node by way of a battery. If the
processor has to the ability to operate at different voltage levels then a DC-DC converter
could be added to the architecture to enable variation of the voltage.
There are many research groups [43, 9, 67] and companies [2, 73] working on hard-
ware implementations of wireless sensor nodes and below is a description of some of the
devices that have gained prominence in the research field.
2.2.1 Mica
The Berkeley Mica architecture is presented in [43] and it is a Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) solution. It consumes 45mW in its active state and 30µW in its sleep state.
The core of the design is an Atmel ATmega128L 8-bit micro-controller, which has
standard digital and analogue interfaces. There is also a radio transceiver, a co-processor
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with external memory to handle wireless reprogramming, and a DC-DC converter to pro-
vide a constant 3 Volts. It features 128Kb of instruction memory and 4Kb of data memory.
There is also a 512Kb flash memory for measurement storage.
It does not have a separate processor for application and protocol processing but relies
on an event based operating system and hardware accelerators to provide sufficient perfor-
mance. The timing hardware accelerator catches the edge transition of the timing pulse.
Once the timing information is captured, software then uses it to configure a serialization
accelerator that automatically times and samples the individual bits. In receive mode, this
accelerator provides a byte to the main datapath. In transmit mode, the micro-controller
writes a byte at a time to this accelerator, which in effect acts like a type of Direct Mem-
ory Access (DMA). It can operate up to 100 Kilobits per second (Kbps). Security can be
implemented in software, on these devices, as there is no crypto accelerator.
2.2.2 Spec
Berkeley [45] have implemented a wireless sensor node minus the sensor system on
an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) using a 25µm process. It measures
2.5mm × 2.5mm, and it consumes 27mW in its active state and 2µW in its sleep state.
An architecture of the device is shown in Figure 2.2. It is estimated that this device would
cost less than one dollar if manufactured in sufficient quantities.
It uses an 8-bit RISC CPU that has 16-bit instructions. It can operate at a frequency of
4Mhz. There is 3Kb of Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) organised into 512 bytes
pages that can be mapped to the data or instruction memory by the address translation unit;
this is so as to enable field programming of the device.
There is no baseband processor but computationally intensive operations of the RF
communications, such as synchronisation and serialisation, are implemented as hardware
accelerators. These accelerators can be used by the CPU to implement the radio protocol.
There is no receiver in this device. It has a transmission rate of 50 Kbps.
Other components that are present are; the ADC for connecting to the sensor data,
the analogue part of the RF sub-system, GPIO ports, system timers and an encryption
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Figure 2.2: Architectural of Spec [45]
accelerator. Encryption is achieved using four 40-bit linear feedback shift registers that
are XORed together to obtain a pseudo-random sequence. They are seeded by software
and two devices would have to agree on this seed value before being able to communicate
securely.
2.2.3 Intel Mote 2
Intel have developed a more powerful platform [2] that is designed for use with more
intensive Digital Signal Processing (DSP) type operations, such as on video or acoustic
data. It is a COTS implementation. In its active state it consumes less than 0.21W and in
its deep sleep state it consumes 331µW .
It is designed around a XScale processor [48](PXA27x), which is a 32-bit device, and
its operating frequency is in the range of 13 MHz to 416 MHz. It has a minimum of
512Kb of SRAM that can be augmented with a maximum of 32Mb of SDRAM. Flash
memory in the device ranges from 32Mb to 64Mb. For communication it uses a IEEE
802.15.4 (Zigbee) transceiver that can operate at 250 Kbps. The CPU has the standard
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I/O interfaces integrated, such as I2C, SSP, UART, GPIO etc., but it also interfaces to
audio and camera devices. There is an accelerator for multimedia operations. Security is
implemented by using the Intel Wireless Trusted Platform which provides cryptographic
engines for a full range of security primitives such as, random number generation, sym-
metric and asymmetric cryptography, key exchange etc.
.
2.2.4 Conclusions
There is no one application scenario for WSN [22] and as such, the specification require-
ments of the wireless sensor nodes will differ depending on their purpose. It has been
argued [44] that the devices fall into four broad categories; specialised for low bandwidth
sensing, generic low bandwidth sensing and communication relay, high bandwidth sens-
ing, and a gateway device for connection to traditional networks. Spec is an example of a
specialised device, Mica is a generic device and Intel mote 2 is used for high bandwidth
sensing.
Energy is a key design constraint for all these categories of devices. Cost will be a
bigger issue with specialised devices as they will be deployed in great numbers. This
thesis targets the area of low bandwidth sensing devices that will have a fixed mission at
deployment, similar to the Spec device.
Only the high bandwidth device, Intel Mote 2, has dedicated hardware support for
asymmetric cryptography. The devices that are being targeted in this research either have
no crypto engines, or rely on software to provide secure data transmission. They do
not have accelerators for the asymmetric cryptosystem that is required to solve the key
distribution problem in WSN. A key goal of this research to investigate a solution to this
problem in an energy constrained device, and to verify and validate the proposed solution.
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2.3 Network Establishment
The wireless sensor nodes must set up an ad-hoc network in order to send data back to the
base station that extracts data from the network. How an individual wireless sensor node
sends its data back to the base station depends on whether the base station is within range
of the wireless sensor nodes, which is the scenario considered in [100]. If the wireless
sensor nodes are capable of changing their transmission power output then there are three
methods of data transfer.
1. Every wireless sensor node transfers its data independently to the base station.
2. Multi-hop networking. Intermediate wireless sensor nodes on the way to the base
station act as relays for the data. This can reduce energy, as the path loss term is
proportional to distance squared. If the energy required by the transmitter in order
for the receiver one metre away to receive the signal is 1nJ per bit, then the energy
required to send this data 50m will be 50×50×1 or 2500nJ , but for five hops of 10m
it will be 5×10×10×1 or 500nJ . Hence there is an eighty per cent improvement
in energy efficiency using a multi hop method.
3. Cluster protocol. In this case, wireless sensor nodes in the same area have collab-
orative data and so these elect a clusterhead that fuses the data before transferring
it to the base station. The clusterhead has to do extra computation and also has
an increased communication cost, because of this the clusters and clusterheads are
changed dynamically.
The method used depends on the number of wireless sensor nodes and distance from
the base station. It has been shown [100] that for distances greater than twenty metres the
cluster protocol is the most efficient.
The discussion above assumes that the clusterhead wireless sensor node can transmit
to the base station. When the wireless sensor node’s transmission range is limited, and
the network is spread over a large geographical area where the individual wireless sensor
nodes do not have access to the base station then a multi-hop networking protocol is
required (see Figure 2.3). In this scenario the wireless sensor nodes in a particular region
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collaborate to send their data to a clusterhead wireless sensor node that performs some
DSP on the data before forwarding it in a multi-hop fashion to the base station.
Figure 2.3: Multi-hop network
In general the routing protocols can be divided into proactive and reactive routing
paradigms [88]. For a proactive protocol, all the wireless sensor nodes store a routing
table that enables them to communicate with every other wireless sensor node in the
system. Any change in the topology would have to be communicated to every wireless
sensor node so that it can update its routing table. In the case of reactive routing the
network only finds routes as they are required. This approach is more suited to distributed
wireless sensor networks, as it lends itself to low duty cycle radio transmission. Reactive
routing can be either destination-initiated, where the data consumer (i.e. the base station)
begins the route discovery process, or source-initiated, which is the opposite.
One such reactive routing scheme is directed diffusion [47]. This is a data centric
protocol that uses a destination-initiated routing scheme. The scheme does not request
data from a particular wireless sensor node but from a geographical area, hence a global
unique addressing system is not required. The sink wireless sensor node (i.e. base station)
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might ask a question such as, “what is the pH in a region X”. This request for data is
known as an interest, and it takes the form of an attribute-value pairs, which in this case
could be the pH level, geographical area and a data rate. The scheme has an exploratory
phase and a reinforcement phase. In the first phase the data query is diffused (broadcast)
through the network with a much reduced data rate in order to evaluate if the interest can
be met. This flooding results in gradients being set up that specify the direction of the
wireless sensor node from where the interest came from. If this first phase is successful
then the data originator can reinforce a path that meets the user criteria of low latency and
low energy. This reinforcement takes the form of increasing the data rate from the data
source to the data sink. There can also be in-network data aggregation to improve the
quality of the result.
In this thesis we assume that a network has been established. The form that the net-
work takes is a multi-hop network where wireless sensor nodes can collaborate in cluster
type formations before sending data back to the base station (see Figure 2.3). We fur-
ther assume that a routing algorithm has been implemented that ensures a robust routing
channel between two nodes in the network. Network establishment and routing protocols
in wireless sensor networks are challenging and active areas of research but will not be
considered further in this thesis.
2.4 Localisation
In order for the sensing measurements to be meaningful, and in order to derive the topol-
ogy of the network, it is necessary for the wireless sensor nodes to know their global
position. One method to do this would be to use GPS, but this would be a costly option
in monetary terms. Another method is to use the radio signal to work out the distance of
each wireless sensor node from some pre-determined points [87] called anchor wireless
sensor nodes, and then triangulation can be used to work out each wireless sensor node’s
global position.
A two-staged algorithm is proposed in [87]. Each of the wireless sensor nodes propa-
gates a relative positional algorithm through the network. When the wireless sensor node
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is in the relative positional map of four or more anchor wireless sensor nodes, it can com-
pute its distance to each anchor device, and then through a process of triangulation it can
work out its own position. It then enters the second stage and performs an iterative process
of triangulation with its adjacent wireless sensor nodes until they agree on their position.
A variation on this method is also proposed [86] that counts the number of hops and uses
the range of each wireless sensor node to work out the distance, instead of calculating the
absolute distance to the anchor devices. It is assumed that in this thesis that the wireless
sensor nodes can run a localisation algorithm in order to determine their relative position
using the techniques outlined above.
2.5 Energy Dissipation
Perhaps the most onerous challenge facing the emerging technology of wireless sensor
networks is the requirement that the devices will have to operate for long periods in hostile
or inaccessible environments where the replacement of the power source would not be
possible. It is of course, for reasons of cost, impractical to replace the power source in
a network containing hundreds or thousands of wireless sensor nodes even if they are
accessible. For this reason it is imperative that the system architecture of the wireless
sensor nodes and the network as a whole should be designed with the aim to minimising
energy dissipation.
There are three sources of energy dissipation in a wireless sensor node; sensing cir-
cuitry, digital computation and radio circuitry (see Figure 2.1). The sensing circuitry
consists of the actual sensor itself and all the amplification and filtering components that
are required. Digital computation is used to provide the DSP of the sensor data and for
implementing the Open System Interconnect (OSI) protocol stack. Finally, the radio cir-
cuitry consists of analogue electronics that are responsible for modulating / demodulating
and actual transmission of the radio signal. This thesis is primarily concerned with min-
imisation of digital computational energy.
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2.5.1 Digital Computational Energy Dissipation
At the device level there are several methods of reducing computational energy consump-
tion. The most common approach is to migrate computationally intensive algorithms from
software to hardware [97]. The software energy profile itself can be modelled [94] that
results in the following equation for the total energy used by a program;
Etotal(VDD, f) = CtotalV
2
DD + (N/f)VDDIOe
VDD
nVt (2.1)
where Ctotal is the total capacitance switched by the program, VDD is the operating volt-
age, N is the number of cycles the program takes to execute, f is the frequency of oper-
ation, IO and n are processor dependent variables, and Vt is the threshold voltage. From
this equation it can be seen that a lowering of the voltage leads to a marked reduction in
energy consumption. When the number of processes running on a processor reduces but
the latency remains the same, then the frequency and hence the voltage can be reduced.
This technique is known as dynamic voltage scaling [38]..
Another technique is to use an ensemble of systems [10]. An example of this is a
multiplier circuit that has a worst case operating condition of a 32× 32 multiplication, but
this does not occur often, and usually there is a 8×8 or 16×16 multiplication. This would
mean in the 8× 8 case that there would be switching on all 32 bit width of the circuitry
even though an 8 bit wide operand was required. This could be ameliorated by having
three separate multiplication circuits and some overhead to decide which one is suited for
a particular operation.
Another method that the wireless sensor node can use to make energy saving is dy-
namic power management [95]. In this scheme the wireless sensor node enters a lower
power state when it is not required to be in active mode. The lowest state it could reach
would be for the sensing and RF circuitry to be turned off, and the processor and memory
to be in sleep mode. It has been shown in [95] that there are several states that a system
can enter, and that in general the lower the state in terms of energy, then the longer it takes
to go into and out of that state, and also the greater the energy overhead in making the
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transition. An analytical formula is presented for the minimum time, Tth,k , required for
the transition to be worthwhile;
Tth,k =
1
2
[τ d,k +
(
P0 + Pk
P0 − Pk
)
τu,k] (2.2)
where P0 is the higher and Pk is the lower energy level, τd,k is the transition time form
P0 to Pk and τu,k is the transition time back to P0. As long as the time between events
that the wireless sensor node needs to process is greater than this minimum time then the
wireless sensor node may enter a lower energy level.
In wireless sensor node the higher layers should be able to adapt the hardware in
response to changes in the system state, or user quality requirements [19]. For example,
in order to extend the lifetime of the device the user may request less sampling or a lower
duty cycle radio transmission. Furthermore, the algorithms that are run on the data could
be curtailed. These last two examples would lead to a decrease in quality of the result but
also a reduction in energy usage. This trade off between energy and quality is the theme
of several papers [10, 96, 41].
It can be shown [96] that minor changes to the algorithms used can lead to significant
improvement in the Energy-Quality behaviour. A simple example of this would be a
power series with ten terms. If the value is less than one, then the first few terms make the
biggest contribution to the overall result. If the value is greater than one then the final few
terms are the most important. Thus the software / hardware can be adapted to first check
if the value is greater than one, and then proceed with the calculation until the required
accuracy is obtained. This method is proven for several common DSP algorithms [96].
In this work computationally intensive operations in software are identified and mi-
grated to hardware. Dynamic voltage scaling is not implemented as we are working at the
block level but it is included in our overall architecture discussion. It is assumed that the
energy and cost of the block are the main design constraints for implementing the security
protocol, but overall energy of the device must also be considered so the performance of
the block must be such that the device can enter a low power state as fast as possible. The
question of quality / energy trade off for security is not dealt with in this work as a fixed
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application is assumed.
2.5.2 Radio Energy Dissipation
The radio transceiver should be designed and operated so as to consume as little energy
as possible. This necessitates a low duty cycle operation. The energy required to transmit
an n-bit packet is given by Equation (2.3) [65],
Etx(n,Rcode, Pamp) = TstartPstart +
n
RRcode
(PtxElec + Pamp) (2.3)
where Pstart and Tstart are power and time required for starting up the transceiver, R is the
bit rate, Rcode is the coding rate, PtxElec is the digital power consumed during transmission
and Pamp is the power required by the amplifier, and it is a function of the transmission
power. The energy required to receive a n-bit packet is given in Equation (2.4) [65],
Ercvd = TstartPstart +
n
RRcode
PrxElec (2.4)
where PrxElec is the energy required to run the radio front-end. The radio should operate
on a low duty cycle [45] (less than 1%) in order to conserve energy. It can be seen from
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) that the packet size, n, should be kept as small as possible.
The transceiver should be designed so that the start-up time before the data can be
transmitted or received is as small as possible [92]. This is because the packets to be
transmitted are typically very small in wireless sensor networks and the start-up energy
can be a significant component of overall energy transmission costs. A low power 0.25µm
CMOS transmitter has been designed [31] that has a start-up energy cost of 440nJ and
costs 10.8nJ to transmit a bit at 2.5 Megabits per second (Mbps).
It has been suggested in [76] that if the wireless sensor node’s power requirement is of
the order of 100mW then they could scavenge their energy source from the environment.
This approach has been used in [82] to develop a self-contained radio transmitter, which
harvests its energy from the environment, using vibration or solar energy sources. It has
been shown that this approach can extract up to 180µW under optimum conditions. In
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this thesis it is assumed that there is a fixed energy reserve.
2.5.3 Sensor Energy Dissipation
MEMSs sensors can be integrated onto the same die as the radio and digital electronics
and so they will consume less energy than a separate chip solution. The sensor on the
device will consume energy in the region of milliwatts. A low power CMOS MEMS
motion sensor has been demonstrated that consumes 15mW of power [84]. In the case
of Akustica [3] a MEMS microphone with a max power figure of 2.7mW is possible.
As with the radio sub-system, it is important that these devices operate on a low duty
cycle. Therefore, when designing a wireless sensor node device it is imperative that all
the computation for the sub-systems is performed as fast and possible so that they can
then enter their low energy state.
2.5.4 Network level Energy Dissipation
The parallel processing capability of the network can be leveraged through distributed
processing to reduce energy dissipation. In [99] an acoustic application to try and find
the line of bearing (LOB) to a source is evaluated. One sensor receives data from all the
other wireless sensor nodes in its vicinity. It must then perform a beam-forming algorithm
that fuses multiple streams of correlated data input into a single high quality output. It
then transmits this data to the base station. This particular algorithm takes two stages
the first of which is a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on the sensors data. The FFT data
is then beam-formed to find the LOB of the source. The FFT operation can be done
sequentially on the wireless sensor node doing the beam-forming or in parallel on the
wireless sensor nodes doing the sensing. In the parallel case, and if the latency does not
change, then dynamic voltage scaling can be used to reduce the energy dissipation of the
algorithm as a whole. It has been shown that the distributed technique has led to a 45%
improvement in energy dissipation. This example shows that, as well as considering the
energy requirements of the individual wireless sensor nodes, the total energy dissipated
in the network should also be considered [79].
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2.6 Security
In order for these networks to be deployed in the field it is essential that the issue of
security is solved as noted in [74, 18]. The challenge for implementing security in WSNs
is that there is not a predetermined infrastructure with which the wireless sensor nodes can
interact. This makes it difficult to distribute symmetric keys to the node using a traditional
approach. This work proposes Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) as a solution to the key
distribution problem.
2.7 Summary
The design challenges and issues facing the emerging technology of WSNs are that the
devices making up the network must cost very little, operate for a long time on a single
power source, self-configure themselves into a robust self healing network, determine
their location relative to each other and secure the network against interception of data.
In order for WSN to be deployed in the field it is essential that the issue of security
be solved [74, 18]. The challenge for implementing security in WSNs is that there is not
a predetermined infrastructure with which the wireless sensor nodes can interact. This
makes it difficult to distribute symmetric keys to the node using a traditional approach.
This work proposes Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) as a solution to the key distribution
problem. Security will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4 after its mathematical
background is introduced in the following chapter.
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Mathematical Background
3.1 Introduction
This work is primarily interested in applying IBC to solve the key distribution problem
in WSN. The IBC protocol considered uses the Tate pairing, which is a bilinear pairing
defined over an elliptic curve, that takes its coordinates from a finite field. Although the
focus of this thesis is not the underlying mathematical framework, knowledge of abstract
algebra, elliptic curves and the Tate pairing is required in order to understand later chap-
ters in this thesis. For this reason, these topics are covered in detail here.
3.2 Groups, Rings and Fields
In order to aid understanding of later chapters of this thesis the abstract algebra concepts
of Groups, Rings and Fields are introduced. Proofs and further information regarding
these topics can be found in references [62, 103].
3.2.1 Group
Definition 3.1 (Group). A group G is set of elements upon which binary operator “×”
has been defined. The operation has the following properties.
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1. Closure: a× b ∈ G, ∀ a, b ∈ G
2. Associativity: (a× b)× c = a× (b× c), ∀ a, b, c ∈ G
3. Identity: ∃ e ∈ G, a× e = e× a = a, ∀ a ∈ G
4. Inverse: ∃ a−1 ∈ G, a× a−1 = a−1 × a = e, ∀ a ∈ G
If the group satisfies the condition below then it is known as an Abelian group
5. Commutativity: a× b = b× a, ∀ a, b ∈ G
When a group has an operation that is similar to addition it is known as an additive
group and the operation is represented by “+”. In this case “0” is the identity element,
and the inverse of “a” is given by “−a”. A multiplicative group has an operation that
resembles multiplication and its operator and inverse are represented as in the list above.
In this case “1” is used for the identity element.
The order of a group is given by the cardinality of the set on which the group is
defined. An example of an infinite Abelian group is the set of integers under addition.
Cryptography is primarily interested in finite groups. Modulo addition can be used to
define a finite group over the set of integers such that x + y ≡ z (mod n) where x, y, z
and n are integers. This leads to the integers being partitioned into n equivalence classes
that can be labeled {0, 1, 2 . . . n−1}. The order of an element, α, of a finite multiplicative
group is defined as the smallest integer β such that αβ = 1.
3.2.2 Ring
Definition 3.2 (Ring). A ringR is set of elements upon which binary operations “×” and
“+” have been defined. The following properties are also required.
1. R forms an Abelian group under “+”
2. Closure under “×”: a× b ∈ G, ∀ a, b ∈ G
3. Associativity under “×”: (a× b)× c = a× (b× c), ∀ a, b, c ∈ R
27
Mathematical Background
4. Distributivity of “×” over “+”: a× (b+ c) = (a× b) + (a× c), ∀ a, b, c ∈ R
If the ring satisfies the condition below then it is a commutative ring
5. Commutativity under “×”: a× b = b× a, ∀ a, b ∈ G
If the ring satisfies the following condition then it is a ring with identity
6. Identity: ∃ e ∈ R, a× e = e× a = a, ∀ a ∈ R
The integers are an example of a ring where the operations are addition and multipli-
cation. Another example of a ring is the set of polynomials with binary coefficients and it
is denoted as F2[x]
3.2.3 Field
Definition 3.3 (Field). A field F is set of elements upon which a binary operations “×”
and “+” have been defined.The following properties are also required.
1. F forms an Abelian group under “+”
2. F− {0} forms an Abelian group under “×”
3. Distributivity of “×” over “+”: a× (b+ c) = (a× b) + (a× c), ∀ a, b, c ∈ F
The set of real numbers form a field, whereas the integers do not, as every element
does not have a multiplicative inverse. A finite or Galois Field (GF) can be generated
from the ring of integers using modulo p addition and multiplication, where p is a prime
number. The resulting GF has elements {0, 1, 2 . . . p − 1} and is known as a prime field.
It is represented by the symbol GF (p), or Fp.
The field GF (2) contains two elements {0, 1} and its addition operation has the same
functionality as a logical XOR gate. Also the multiplication operation can be represented
by the logical AND gate.
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3.2.4 Galois Fields of order pm
Analogously to the integers, a finite field can be defined over the ring of polynomials
GF (p)[x] where p is a prime number. The field is constructed by performing modulo
f(x) reduction of the ring GF (p)[x], where f(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree
m with coefficients ∈ GF (p), such that it has a root α of order 2m − 1. f(x) and α are
known as a primitive polynomial and primitive element respectively of the field GF (pm).
All finite fields have pn elements, where n is an integer and are unique up to iso-
morphism. The field GF (pm) can be considered as an extension field of the subfield
GF (p). An extension field of GF (pm) can be constructed by using the same technique
as above but now the primitive polynomial will have coefficients ∈ GF (pm) and have
degree k. This results in the finite field GF (pmk). In this thesis, only finite fields of the
form GF (2m) and GF (2mk) are considered as they map easily to hardware.
The characteristic of a field is the smallest integer, char, such that when an element
from the finite field is added char times then the result is “0”. In the case of GF (pm) the
characteristic is p as all addition is performed modulo p.
3.2.5 Basis Representation
A finite field is a vector space and as such, can be spanned by a set of elements. For
GF (pm), it has a basis of dimension m− 1. Thus all elements of GF (pm) can be written
as a linear combination of the basis vectors
γ = {a0β0 + a1β1 + a2β2 + am−1βm−1}
where aj ∈ GF (p), and βj ∈ GF (pm) are the basis vectors. There are a number of
different examples of basis such as polynomial or normal. For this work the basis that has
been selected is polynomial. The squaring operation and square root operation are easier
to implement in normal basis but multiplication is much more costly in terms of area
and performance than if these arithmetic operations were implemented in a polynomial
basis. And as is shown later, there are more multiplications than squaring or square root
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operations required to implement the Tate pairing. Due to the dominance of multiplication
over the squaring and the square root operation it has been found that in characteristic
three an implementation of the Tate pairing using a polynomial basis performs better than
one using a normal basis [36]. The assumption for this work is that this result would also
hold in characteristic two.
Definition 3.4 (Polynomial Basis). The polynomial basis is a set of elements
{α0, α1, α2 . . . αm−1} where α ∈ GF (pm) is the root of the primitive polynomial f(x)
used to define the field GF (pm).
Elements of the GF can be represented using a polynomial GF (p)[α] of degree m− 1
i.e. {am−1αm−1 + am−2αm−2 . . . a1α1 + a0} where a0→(m−1) ∈ GF (p). The multiplica-
tive structure of the finite field can also be represented as a series of powers of α i.e.
{α0, α1, α2 . . . α2m−2}.
3.2.6 Hardware Representation
The polynomial f(x) = x3 + x+ 1 ∈ F2[x] is irreducible as f(1) = 1 and f(0) = 1, and
therefore it has no factors in the field GF (2). It can be used to generate the finite field
GF (23). Every polynomial g(x) ∈ F2[x] (mod f(x)) is equivalent to a polynomial R(x)
that is of order less than three, and R(x) is represented as below.
R(x) = r2x
2 + r1x+ r0 (mod f(x)), ∀rj ∈ GF (2). (3.1)
In order to represent this element R(X) in hardware three D-type flip flops are re-
quired, where the Most Significant Bit (MSB) represents r2. When a element such as
R(x) is multiplied by x this results in a polynomial that has a term in x3 which must be
reduced modulo f(x).
xR(x) = r2x
3 + r1x
2 + r0x (mod f(x))
= r2(x+ 1) + r1x
2 + r0x (mod f(x))
= r1x
2 + (r0 + r2)x+ r2 (mod f(x))
(3.2)
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Multiplying by x is equivalent to a shift in a shift register with the MSB connected to
the Least Significant Bit (LSB), and the value of the register representing the x term is
generated from adding r0 and r2 in GF (2). The x term is generated in hardware by
r0⊕r2, where⊕ is the symbol for an XOR gate. Thus, multiplying by x requires a Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) as in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Circuit for the operation xR(x) (mod f(x))
If the R(x) is multiplied by a0x then the result is
a0xR(x) = a0r1x
2 + a0(r0 + r2)x+ a0r2 (mod f(x)) (3.3)
where, for example, the term a0(r0 + r2) can be represented in gates as a0 ⊗ (r0 ⊕ r2),
where ⊗ is an AND gate.
From the above, it can be seen that arithmetic primitive in GF (2m) can be imple-
mented in hardware with D-type flip flops, XOR gates and AND gates. Primitives for
other arithmetic operations are presented in Chapter 5.
3.3 Elliptic Curves
In the following discussion the theory of elliptic curve is described. Further information
and proofs can be found in references [39, 101, 12]
3.3.1 Weierstrass Equation
Definition 3.5 (Weierstrass Equation). An elliptic curve E over the field GF (pm) is
given by the Weierstrass equation
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E(GF (pm)) = y2 + a1xy + a3y ≡ x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6 (3.4)
where ai ∈ GF (pm) and the discriminant∆ 6= 0. Also (x, y) ∈ GF (pmk)×GF (pmk)
where m, k are integers. There is also an additional point on the curve known as the point
at infinity, O.
3.3.2 Supersingular and non-supersingular curves
Theorem 3.1 (Hasse). The number of points on the curve is
#E(GF (pm)) = pm + 1− t, (3.5)
where t is the trace of Frobenius and is equal to
|t| ≤ 2
√
(pm). (3.6)
Definition 3.6 (supersingular). If the trace of Frobenius, t, is divisible by the character-
istic of GF (pm) then the elliptic curve is known as supersingular.
This means that a supersingular curve has a group order of pm + 1
Definition 3.7 (non-supersingular). If the trace of Frobenius, t, is not divisible by the
characteristic of GF (pm) then the elliptic curve is known as non-supersingular.
The Weierstrass equation (3.4) can be simplified in the case where the characteristic
of the underlying field is two. If a1 6= 0 then a non-supersingular elliptic curve E defined
overGF (2m) is given in (3.7) such that a, b ∈ GF (2m). Also, (x, y) ∈ GF (2mk)×GF (2mk)
where m, k are integers.
y2 + xy ≡ x3 + ax2 + b (3.7)
A supersingular curve is defined when a1 = 0 and is given by the equation
y2 + cy ≡ x3 + ax+ b (3.8)
32
Mathematical Background
where a, b, c ∈ GF (2m) and the discriminant ∆ = c4.
Of particular interest to this work is the supersingular case and these are the curves
that will be used for the rest of this thesis. For the curve considered in this thesis a, b and
c are 1.
3.3.3 Elliptic curve arithmetic
The points of an elliptic curve form an Abelian group under addition. This addition
operation is defined using a geometrical argument. If the curve is defined over the set of
real numbers then it can be represented as in Figure 3.2. In this diagram the points P and
R are added to give the result Q, which has coordinates (x3, y3). To calculate Q a line is
drawn through points P and R, which have coordinates (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) respectively,
then the equation for this line in entered into the equation of the curve and is solved for x.
This value, x3, is entered into the equation of the line to obtain y3. Then the point Q′ has
P 
R 
Q’ 
Q 
Figure 3.2: Point Addition
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coordinates (x3,−y3) and this point is reflected in the x axis to get the required result, Q.
When P = R then the points have to be doubled (see Figure 3.3) and the technique is
slightly different. A tangent is taken at a point P and the equation for this line is used as
above to obtain the point Q.
P 
Q’ 
Q 
Figure 3.3: Point Doubling
In order for the points on the curve to form a group they have to have an identity el-
ement and an inverse. The identity element is defined as the point at infinity (O) such
that P +O = P and the inverse is the reflection of the point in the x axis such that
P + (−P ) = O.
When working with a supersingular curve and when P 6= R, point addition is defined
as
x3 = λ
2 + x1 + x2, (3.9)
y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + y1 + 1, (3.10)
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where λ = y1+y2
x1+x2
is the gradient of the line joining P and R.
When P = R the equations for Q are defined as
x3 = λ
2, (3.11)
y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + y1 + 1, (3.12)
where λ = x21 + 1 is the gradient of the tangent at P obtained by implicit differentiation
of the curve.
3.4 Divisor Theory
Divisors are introduced in this section and a more in depth discussion of the topic can be
found in references [101, 63]
Definition 3.8 (Divisor). A divisorD is a formal sum of points P on the curveE(GF (2mk))
D =
∑
P∈E
np(P ), (3.13)
where np is an integer and equal to zero for all but finitely many P .
The degree of a divisor is given by Equation (3.14), and it is an integer value.
deg(D) =
∑
np (3.14)
The support of a divisor are the points on the curve such that np is not zero, and it is
given by Equation (3.15).
supp(D) = {P ∈ E |np 6= 0} (3.15)
The sum of a divisor is the value obtained when the points that make up the divisor
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are added together. This is a point of the curve and it is given by Equation (3.16)
sum(D) =
∑
npP ∈ E(GF (2mk)) (3.16)
The set of divisors form a group where the group operation is addition and it is defined
as ∑
P∈E
np(P ) +
∑
P∈E
mp(P ) =
∑
P∈E
(np +mp)(P ). (3.17)
The divisor of rational functions on the elliptic curve has np positive when the function
evaluates to zero and np is negative when it evaluates to ∞ at a point P . The order of the
point is calculated using the uniforming parameter for P .
Of particular interest to this thesis is the function l1, which is the line from P to Q′ in
Figure 3.2 and the function l2, which is the line Q′ to Q in the same figure. The divisors
of these functions are
div(l1) = (P ) + (R) + (Q
′)− 3O. (3.18)
div(l2) = (Q) + (Q
′)− 2O. (3.19)
The degree of the these two divisors is equal to zero, and their sum equates toO, which is
always the case for a rational function on an elliptic curve. These divisors are known as
principle and are denoted by Dl. Dl is a subgroup of D0, which is the divisors of degree
zero. The divisor of the product and quotient of the two functions are give below
div(l1l2) = div(l1) + div(l2) = (P ) + (R) + 2(Q
′) + (Q) + 5O, (3.20)
div
(
l1
l2
)
= div(l1)− div(l2) = (P ) + (R)− (Q)−O. (3.21)
There is an equivalence relation between two divisors, D1, D2 ∈ D0 such that D1 ≡
D2 if D1 = D2 + div(f) where f is a function on the curve. Every D ∈ D0 can be
mapped to a point Q = sum(D) such that D ≡ (Q)− (O). With reference to Figure 3.2,
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Equation (3.18) and Equation (3.19) if,
D1 = (P )− (O) + div(g1), (3.22)
D2 = (R)− (O) + div(g2), (3.23)
where g1, g2 are rational functions on the elliptic curve, then these two divisors add to give
D1 +D2 = (P ) + (R)− 2(O) + div(g1) + div(g2)
= (P ) + (R) + (Q′)− 3(O) + (Q)− (O)− (Q′)− (Q) + 2(O) + div(g1) + div(g2)
= div(l1) + (Q)− (O)− div(l2) + div(g1) + div(g2)
= (Q)− (O) + div
(
l1
l2
g1g2
)
.
(3.24)
A similar result can be found for point doubling.
3.5 Discrete Logarithm Problem
The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is the basis for the security of the algorithms used
in this work and defined as;
Definition 3.9 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Given f = gx ∈ G and g is the generator
element of the finite cyclic group G, the problem posed is to find the value of the integer
x.
In the context of this work the problem is posed over the fieldsGF (2mk) andE(GF (2m))[l]
where it is known as the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The
ECDLP is given two points on the elliptic curve xP and P , where P generates a finite
cyclic group, what is the integer x.
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3.6 The Tate Pairing
If l |#E(GF (2m) where l is a large prime l, and k is the smallest integer such that
l | (2mk − 1) then the Tate pairing is defined as [101, 11];
Definition 3.10 (The Tate Pairing). The Tate pairing, el, is the mapping
el = E(GF (2
mk))[l]× E(GF (2mk))/lE(GF (2mk))→ (GF (2mk))∗/(GF (2mk))∗l
= G1 ×G2 → GT
(3.25)
where the l torsion points, G1, are
E(GF (2mk))[l] = {P ∈ E(GF (2mk)) | lP = O}. (3.26)
And two points P,Q ∈ E(GF (2mk)) are members of the same equivalence class, G2, if
P ≡ Q (mod E(GF (2mk))/lE(GF (2mk)) (3.27)
i.e. P = Q+ lR where R ∈ E(GF (2mk)). Similarly a, b ∈ (GF (2mk))∗ are members of
the same equivalence class, GT , such that
a ≡ b (mod (GF (2mk))∗/(GF (2mk))∗l) (3.28)
which can be also be stated as a = bcl for c ∈ (GF (2mk))∗.
Its most desirable property in the context of cryptography is bilinearity
el(aP, bQ) ≡ el(aP,Q)b ≡ el(P, bQ)a ≡ el(P,Q)ab (3.29)
where a, b are integers. The exponent 2mk−1
l
of the output of the pairing to provides a
unique value rather than a member of an equivalence class. The integer k is known as the
security multiplier and is four for the particular curve considered in this thesis.
The Tate pairing essentially takes two points on an elliptic curve and maps them to
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a element of a multiplicative group of a large finite extension field. The choice of the
elliptic curve group over which the ECDLP is posed must be such that it requires at least
280 operations to solve. Therefore l has to be at least of the order of ≈ 2160 (see Section
4.4.3). Also, the finite field to which the Tate pairing maps must be sufficiently large to
make the DLP intractable i.e. that it has a running time of 280. For a binary field, as
used in this thesis, it has to be of the order of 21024 . From equation (4.4) this means that
running time for solving the DLP is 284.As k = 4 for the curve used in this thesis, this
means that m must be at least 250. It was initially decided to use a NIST approved curve
and therefore m has been selected as 283 [71].
3.7 Algorithms for calculating the Tate pairing
Let DP ≡ (P )− (O) where P ∈ E(GF (2mk)[l]. A function on the curve fP with divisor
div(fP ) is defined by
div(fP ) = lDP = l(P )− l(O) (3.30)
as lP = O and the degree of div(fP ) is zero. If another divisor DQ ∈ D0 i.e. DQ ≡∑
R∈Emr(R) ≡ (Q) − (O) where Q ∈ E(GF (2mk))/lE(GF (2mk)), and DP and DQ
have disjoint support, then the Tate pairing can be defined as
el(P,Q) = fP (DQ) =
∏
fP (R)
mr . (3.31)
Their divisors have to have disjoint support or else Equation (3.31) would equate to zero.
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Given DP = (P )− (O) + div(1) and Equation (3.24) then fP can be calculated by
2DP = (P + P )− (O) + div( l1
l2
1.1) = (2P )− (O) + div(f1
f2
)
4DP = (2P + 2P )− (O) + div( l1
l2
f 21
f 22
) = (4P )− (O) + div(f1
f2
)
5DP = (4P + P )− (O) + div( l1
l2
f1
f2
.1) = (5P )− (O) + div(f1
f2
)
.
.
.
lDP = ((l − 1)P + P )− (O) + div( l1
l2
f1
f2
.1) = div(
f1
f2
)
(3.32)
3.7.1 Miller’s Algorithm
Miller’s algorithm [64] (see Algorithm 1) uses the above technique, given in Equation
(3.32), to calculate the Tate pairing. By Equation (3.31) the output that is required is
fP ((Q)− (O)). Instead of waiting until the fP is found and then inserting DQ into the
function, the intermediate functions are calculated at DQ. In order to prevent an inter-
mediate function evaluating to zero, i.e. DQ is in the support of the function, a random
point on the curve, S ∈ E(GF (2mk), is chosen so as to generate Q′ = Q+ S. Therefore
DQ ≡ (Q′) − (S) ≡ (Q) − (O) and it is at these values the intermediate functions are
calculated. If T has coordinates (tx, ty) and U = 2T has coordinates (ux, uy) then
Algorithm 1 Miller’s Algorithm [64]
n = blog2 lc − 1
Q′ = Q+ S where random S ∈ E(GF (2mk)
f = 1, T = P
for n downto 1 do
T = 2T
f = f 2 (l2T (Q
′)l2T−2T (S))
(l2T (S)l2T−2T (Q′))
if nth bit of l = 1 then
T = T + P
f = f
(lT+P (Q
′)l(T+P )−(T+P )(S))
(lT+P (S)l(T+P )−(T+P )(Q′))
end if
end for
return fP (DQ) = f
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ux = λ
2
uy = λ(tx + ux) + ty + 1
(3.33)
where λ = t2x + 1 is the gradient of the tangent at T . Also if Q′ and S have coordinates
(q′x, q
′
y) and (sx, sy) respectively, then
l2T (Q
′) = q′y + λ(tx + q
′
x) + ty
l2T (S) = sy + λ(tx + sx) + ty
(3.34)
and
l2T−2T (Q′) = q′x + ux
l2T−2T (S) = sx + ux
(3.35)
If U = T + P and P has coordinates (px, py) then
ux = λ
2 + tx + px
uy = λ(tx + ux) + ty + 1
(3.36)
where λ = ty+py
tx+px
is the gradient of the line joining T and P . And the line functions are
evaluated at
lT+P (Q
′) = q′y + λ(tx + q
′
x) + ty
lT+P (S) = sy + λ(tx + sx) + ty
(3.37)
and
l(T+P )−(T+P )(Q′) = q′x + ux
l(T+P )−(T+P )(S) = sx + ux
(3.38)
If the nth bit of l = 0, then this algorithm requires six multiplications and one inver-
sions in GF (2mk) in the loop, and these are both costly operations – see Chapter 5.
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3.7.2 BKLS/GHS Algorithm
The BKLS/GHS algorithm [33, 8] improves upon Miller’s algorithm. If P ∈ E(GF (2m)[l]
and Q ∈ E(GF (2m))[l] the modified Tate pairing is el(P, φ(Q)) 2
mk−1
l where φ is a dis-
tortion map and the final value is raised to the value 2mk−1
l
to provide a unique value of
the lth roots of unity , µl, rather than a member of an equivalence class. This pairing is
symmetric with G1 = G2 = G.
el = G×G→ µl (3.39)
As P ∈ E(GF (2m)[l] this means that all the point doubling and adding takes place in the
field GF (2m) rather than GF (2mk), which reduces the amount of computation required.
Also, the intermediate functions are in this subfield, which means that multiplication by
λ requires less resources – see Equation (3.34) and (3.37).
It is demonstrated in [8] that the final exponentiation ,2mk−1
l
, has a factor 2m − 1 and
that
el(P,Q) = fP (DQ) = fp((Q)− (O)) 2
mk−1
l = fp((Q))
2mk−1
l (3.40)
This is because fp((O)) ∈ GF (2m) and therefore due to Fermat’s little theorem is equal
to the identity element (see Equation (3.41))
fp((O))2m−1 ≡ 1 (mod f(x)) (3.41)
where f(x) is used to generate the field GF (2m).
The distortion map φ takes a point onE(GF (2m)) and maps it to a point onE(GF (2mk))
φ(qx, qy) = (qx + s
2, qy + sqx + t) (3.42)
where s2 + s+ 1 = 0 and t2 + t+ s = 0 for the curve considered in this thesis. It is
shown in [8] that the final exponentiation also means that the functions l2T−2T (φ(Q)) 2
mk−1
l
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and l(T+P )−(T+P )(φ(Q))
2mk−1
l evaluate to unity.
l2T−2T (φ(Q))
2mk−1
l = 1
l(T+P )−(T+P )(φ(Q))
2mk−1
l = 1
(3.43)
The curve that is being used is
E(GF (2283)) = y2 + y ≡ x3 + x+ 1 (3.44)
and l = #E(GF (2m) = 2283 + 2142 + 1, which has a small Hamming weight and this
reduces the number of times that the “add” branch of the loop is entered.
Algorithm 2 BKLS/GHS Algorithm [33, 8]
n = blog2 lc − 1
Q′ = φ(Q)
f = 1, T = P
for n downto 1 do
T = 2T
f = f 2(l2T (Q
′))
if nth bit of l = 1 then
T = T + P
f = f(lT+P (Q
′))
end if
end for
return f
2mk−1
l
Neglecting the “add” branch of the loop, as it is only entered three times, then this
algorithm requires only one multiplications between elements in GF (2mk), which is an
obvious improvement on Algorithm 1. The calculation of 2T only requires one multi-
plication in GF (2m) (see Equation (3.33)) and l2T (Q′) requires four multiplications as
λ ∈ GF (2m) and (tx + q′x) ∈ GF (2mk).
l2T (Q
′) = q′y + λ(tx + q
′
x) + ty (3.45)
The operations f = f 2(l2T (Q′)), where f ∈ GF (2mk), requires four squarings in
GF (2m), followed by a multiplication in GF (2mk) which can be accomplished with nine
multiplications in GF (2m) (see Section 5.5.3). Therefore, every time the “double” branch
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of the loop is entered fourteen GF (2m) multiplications are computed.
3.7.3 η Algorithm
Based upon the work of Duursma and Lee [27], a closed form of the Tate pairing calcula-
tion, which is known as the η algorithm, has been obtained for characteristic two [59, 6].
The Tate pairing is given by
fp(φ(Q))
2mk−1
l = gp(φ(Q))
22m−1 (3.46)
where
gp =
2m∏
i=1
l2
2m−i
2iP (3.47)
and l2iP is the equation of the tangent to the curve at the point 2iP . Through application
of the distortion map and a lot of algebraic manipulation Equation (3.48) is arrived at and
this is rewritten in the form of Algorithm 3.
gp(φ(Q)) =
m∏
i=1
p2
i
x q
2(−i+1)
x + p
2i
y + q
2(−i+1)
y + s
2(p2
i
x + q
2(−i+1)
x ) + t
2 + b (3.48)
This algorithm requires seven multiplications in the field GF (2m), a big improvement
Algorithm 3 η Algorithm [59, 6]
P = (px, py), Q = (qx, qy)
C(x) = c3x
3 + c2x
2 + c1x+ c0 = 1
for i = 1 to m do
px = p
2
x
py = p
2
y
z = px + qx
w = z + pxqx + py + qy + 1
c0 = c0w + (c2 + c3)(z + 1) + c3
c1 = c0w + (c1 + c2 + c3)w + (c0 + c2 + c3)(w + z + 1) + c3(z + 1) + c0 + c3
c2 = c0w+ (c1+ c2+ c3)w+ (c0+ c2+ c3)(w+ z+1)+ (c1+ c2)(w+ z+1)+ c1
c3 = (c1 + c2 + c3)w + (c1 + c2)(w + z + 1) + c2
qx = q
2m−1
x
qy = q
2m−1
y
end for
return fp(φ(Q))
2mk−1
l = C(x)2
2m−1
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on the previous algorithms. It has a regular structure that maps well to hardware, and
so it will be the Tate pairing algorithm that will be implemented in this thesis. Another
approach would have been to use the ηT algorithm to implement the Tate pairing [6]. This
algorithm has half the loop of the η but a more complicated final exponentiation which is
given in equation (3.49).
C(x) = C(x)(2
2m−1)(22m+2m+12 +1)(2m+12 −1) (3.49)
This final exponentiation require three Frobenius operations, m+1 squarings, four multi-
plications and two inversions all taking place in the finite extension field. When selecting
an algorithm to implement it was judged that this would lead to a design with more com-
plicated datapath and control logic, and also a larger design that could be achieved by
using the η algorithm. This would seem to be confirmed by the recent results of Shu [93]
(see Table 6.4). As future work it should be implemented to compare with the η approach.
3.8 Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem
The identity based cryptosystems discussed later in this thesis are based on the hardness
of the Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem (BDHP).
Definition 3.11 (Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem). Given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ E(GF (2m))
it is computationally infeasible to calculate el(P, P )abc ∈ GF (2mk)
This implies that the Diffie Hellman Problem (DHP) is also a hard problem inE(GF (2m))
and GF (2mk). The DHP in E(GF (2m)) is that given P , aP and bP it is hard to calcu-
late abP . If this was not the case then abP and cP could be input to the Tate pairing to
calculate el(P, P )abc = el(abP, cP ), and so the BDHP is solved.
The DHP in GF (2mk) is given three elements α, αx and αy ∈ GF (2mk) it is com-
putationally infeasible to calculate αxy ∈ GF (2mk) if the field is large enough. Also,
if the DHP is easy in GF (2mk) then the BDHP can be solved. For given el(aP, bP ) =
el(P, P )
ab and el(P, cP ) = el(P, P )c then el(P, P )abc can be calculated.
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3.9 Summary
The cryptographic protocol outlined in Chapter 4 makes use of the Tate pairing, which
is a bilinear map defined over an elliptic curve. It takes two points on a elliptic curve,
that have coordinates in GF (2m), and maps them to a element of the l roots of unity in
GF (2mk). The underlying field GF (2m) on which the elliptic curve is defined should be
large enough so that the ECDLP is computationally infeasible, this means that it should
be of the order of at least 2160 – see Chapter 4. The DHP is posed in the field to which
the Tate pairing maps these points, and in order for the problem to be secure the size
of the field has to be at least 21000. As the security multiplier, k, is four for the curve
considered in this thesis, then m has to be at least 250. In fact, the curve that is being used
is E(GF (2283)) – see Equation (3.44)
The Tate pairing was originally calculated using Miller’s algorithm [64]. Improve-
ments have recently been proposed to Miller’s algorithm to reduce its cost in terms of its
execution time [33, 8, 59, 6]. Of particular interest in this thesis is the η algorithm pro-
posed in [59, 6] which is the most amenable to a low energy hardware implementation,
as it is has the least number of multiplications in the subfield, is defined over a field of
characteristic two and has a regular structure which maps well to hardware (see Algorithm
3).
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Security Considerations in a WSN
4.1 Introduction
There is a clear need for security in a wireless sensor network. The main requirements,
known as confidentiality and authentication respectively, are that the data exchanged in
the network should not be read by an unauthorised third party and also that this third party
cannot join the network.
Confidentiality can be assured by data encryption, either with an asymmetric or sym-
metric cipher. In practice, an asymmetric system is considered too costly in terms of its
computational complexity to perform any task other than the distribution of symmetric
keys, or sending one off messages of the order of a symmetric key . In order to per-
form network access control the wireless sensor nodes should be able to generate digital
signatures.
4.2 Symmetric Systems
In symmetric key cryptosystems security is dependent on keeping the key that is shared
between the communicating wireless sensor nodes a secret. This means that an adversary
should not be able to obtain the key, and that if it does then the security of the system is
compromised.
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Figure 4.1 shows Alice encrypting a message, m, with the encryption algorithm, E,
and the secret key, k. The adversary, Eve, can only see the ciphertext, c. Bob uses the
publicly available decryption algorithm, D, together with the secret key to extract the
message.
Figure 4.1: Symmetric Cryptosystem
The feasibility of a symmetric scheme for wireless sensor networks has been proved
[51]. In this scheme a software approach has been shown to only add a 10% overhead of
energy, though it should be noted that the key distribution problem is not addressed in this
scheme.
4.3 Key Distribution
Of the many challenges facing real deployments of WSNs, the distribution of symmetric
keys in the network is one of the most difficult to address. As there is no in-situ infras-
tructure for the wireless sensor nodes to interact with in order to obtain keys on the fly,
like in a traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) approach, novel techniques have to be
employed. This section discusses different approaches to the key distribution problem.
4.3.1 System-Wide Key
The simplest approach to deploy a symmetric system would be that all the wireless sensor
nodes share the same key. As the wireless sensor nodes could be placed in a region where
an adversary can capture them, it is likely that it could extract the secret key, and therefore
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would be able to monitor all communication in the network. For this reason, this method
of ensuring privacy is not appropriate in a hostile environment.
4.3.2 Pair-Wise Keys
Another method would be for all the wireless sensor nodes to set up pair-wise keys be-
tween them before deployment. If there are n wireless sensor nodes in the network then
each wireless sensor node would have to store n − 1 keys in its persistent memory. In
a resource constrained device this would be a problem as storing the keys would use too
much memory. The other main drawback to using this scheme is that it does not scale. If,
after deploying the bulk of the wireless sensor nodes, it is required to add extra wireless
sensor nodes then this is not possible unless the extra wireless sensor nodes’ keys are
already programmed in the deployed network. Upon capture of a wireless sensor node,
however, only its n− 1 links will be compromised, which is a slight improvement on the
system that uses only one symmetric key.
4.3.3 Probabilistic Key Sharing
Yet another symmetric technique is probabilistic key sharing [29]. In this approach a
large pool of keys is generated from which a smaller ring of keys is randomly selected
and preloaded before deployment into each wireless sensor node. Each wireless sensor
node thus has a separate ring of keys in which there may be a shared key. During the
shared key discovery phase of the algorithm, the wireless sensor nodes ascertain whether
or not there is secure path between them. It has been shown [29] that in order to create a
network of 10,000 wireless sensor nodes the pool of keys has to be 100,000 and the key
ring only has to be 250. This system is scalable as when a new wireless sensor node is
added to network it only has to be preloaded with a random selection of 250 keys from
the key pool. However, this scheme is not secure against capture by an adversary. If one
wireless sensor node is captured then there is a probability of 250
100000
that any of the links
in the network can be deciphered, but this increases to 1
10
after the capture of 40 wireless
sensor nodes.
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4.3.4 Public Key Systems
Another approach to key distribution is to employ an asymmetric or public key system.
In these schemes there is a private/public key pair and it is considered computationally
infeasible to calculate the private key from the public one. The wireless sensor nodes can
be deployed with an embedded private/public key pair. They then broadcast the public key
to their neighbours who can then use this public key to encrypt a message to them. This
scheme has the added advantage that private key can be used to generate digital signatures.
Asymmetric systems are secure against individual wireless sensor node capture and they
are also scalable.
4.4 Asymmetric Approaches
From the discussion of Section 4.3 an asymmetric or public key cryptosystem would seem
to be the best approach for distributing symmetric keys in a WSN. The security of these
systems is ensured on the basis of a hard number theoretic problem, some of which are
outlined below.
4.4.1 RSA System
RSA’s [80] security is based on the difficulty of factoring a large integer. When two 512
bit numbers such as p and q are multiplied together to create a 1024 bit number n, there
is no known polynomial time algorithm to factor this number.
n = p.q (4.1)
4.4.2 El Gamal System
El Gamal’s security [28] is based on solving the DLP in a finite field. Let α, β ∈ Zp, then
β is calculated as
β ≡ αy (mod p) (4.2)
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where y is an integer and α is a generator element of Zp and p is a large prime number.
The fastest algorithm for solving the DLP given α and β is based on the index calculus
algorithm and is known as the function field sieve [1]. This works by selecting a number
of small prime numbers from which their discrete logarithmic can be found with regard to
α. The DLP can now be solved as the element αy can be generated by multiplying together
elements in the factors base, and their exponents can be added to give the required result.
The running time for this algorithm is
O(exp(1.923n
1/3ln2/3n)) (4.3)
In the case where α, β ∈ GF (2m) and
β ≡ αy (mod p(x)) (4.4)
where y is an integer and α is a generator element of GF (2m). Then y can be calculated
using Coppersmith’s algorithm [23]. The running time for this algorithm is
O(exp(1.587n
1/3ln2/3n)) (4.5)
4.4.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) [39] are based on the ECDLP, which is defined as
follows; given two points P and Q such that Q = sP , then what is the value of the integer
s. The Index Calculus approach cannot be taken as one cannot factorise elliptic curve
points, the elements in the group, and therefore the best algorithm for solving the ECDLP
is Pollard’s ρ method [75]. This algorithm employs a random function to generate a point
in the group of order n that can be written as R1 = x1P + y1Q, which is then input to the
algorithm to generate another point R2 = x2P + y2Q. All of these points are stored and
when two points are the same then the ECDLP can be solved. If R1 = R2 and Q = sP
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then;
x1P + y1Q = x2P + y2Q
x1P + y1sP = x2P + y2sP
(y1 − y2)sP = (x1 − x2)P
∴ s = (x1 − x2)(y1 − y2)−1 (mod n)
(4.6)
This algorithm has a running time of O(
√
n).
Therefore, the operands used in ECDLP can be smaller than the ones used in the DLP,
which is set over a multiplicative group in a finite field. If it is considered infeasible for an
adversary to perform 280 operations then n must be at least 2160 in order that the ECDLP
provides sufficient security. The different key sizes required for the different approaches
are presented in Table 4.4.3. From this, it can be seen that ECC only requires a key size
of 163 bits to have the same level of security as 1024 bit El Gamal / RSA. ECC would
seem to be the appropriate choice for WSNs. This smaller key size translates directly into
an energy saving for the device, as fewer bits are required to be transmitted by the radio.
The smaller operand size will also lead to a reduction in energy dissipated by the digital
circuitry. However, in order to deploy any of these approaches, a PKI is required, see
Section 4.5, and this poses significant difficulties in the context of WSNs.
ECC key El Gamal Security strength
163 1024 80
283 3072 128
409 7680 192
571 15360 256
Table 4.1: Equivalent key sizes in bits for ECC and El Gamal [71]
4.5 Public Key Infrastructure
In order to deploy a traditional asymmetric cryptosystem there has to be a PKI and Cer-
tificate Authority (CA) in place [58] that is responsible for providing digital certificates.
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These certificates, which bind a wireless sensor node’s identity to its public key, are then
used by the wireless sensor nodes to prove that they have a valid public key. In Figure
4.2 the CA issues the keys kbob public and kalice public to alice and bob, respectively.
These keys are incorporated in a digital certificate that can be verified with CA’s public
key and are then used with the encryption, E, and decryption algorithms, D, to securely
send a message, m.
Figure 4.2: Public Key Infrastructure
In the context of WSNs, it is envisaged that each wireless sensor node will have stored
the CA’s public key, its private key and a digital certificate issued by the CA for its public
key. The CA in this system would be the base station that originally programmed the
wireless sensor nodes and extracts data from the network - see Figure 4.3.
The steps required for secure communication are given in Algorithm 4. The message
in this case is a key for a symmetric cryptosystem. Steps one and five require that the
wireless sensor nodes communicate with each other. As the radio is likely to be the main
consumer of energy in the wireless sensor node, it is important to minimize the number
of bits transmitted.
Unauthorised message recovery and malicious packet injection into the network is
prevented using this algorithm. Messages will only be encrypted and sent to the wireless
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Figure 4.3: Deploying PKI in a WSN
Algorithm 4 PKI Data Transfer
1: Alice sends Bob her digital certificate.
2: Bob verifies the certificate using the CA’s public key.
3: Bob signs his message using private key.
4: Bob encrypts the message using Alice’s public key.
5: Bob sends the encrypted message, digital signature and his digital certificate to Alice.
6: Alice verifies Bob’s digital certificate using the CA’s public key.
7: Alice decrypts the message using her private key.
8: Alice verifies the digital signature using Bob’s public key.
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sensor nodes from which valid digital certificates have been received. Similarly, messages
will only be accepted if they have a valid digital signature and this can only be verified
if a valid digital certificate has been received. Since only wireless sensor nodes that are
programmed by the base station will have valid private key / digital certificate pairs, access
control is achieved.
Also, this scheme is easily scalable as new wireless sensor nodes just need to be
programmed with a valid private key and digital certificate by the base station before
deployment to communicate with the other wireless sensor nodes in the network.
A traditional ECC technique such as the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
(ECIES) [39] has a ciphertext (R,C, t) where R is a point in the curve E(GF (2163)), C
is the output of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm and t is a message
authentication code. In this case R is 164 bits, if point compression is used i.e. the
x-coordinate is transmitted and also one bit to indicate which of the two values of the
y-coordinate is valid. C is 128 bits and t is 160 bits. The total number of bits in the
ciphertext is 452. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [39] would be
an appropriate choice for the signing algorithm. The numbers of bits transmitted in the
signature is 320.
From Algorithm 4 it can be seen that two digital certificates are sent. The certificates
are a point on the curve and the wireless sensor nodes identity signed using ECDSA and
therefore are 494 bits long (164 + 10 + 320), if the identify of the wireless sensor node is
10 bits. The total number of bits transmitted in a communication round is 1670.
4.6 Identity-Based Cryptography
The concept of IBE was proposed by Shamir in 1984 [89], but it was not until 2001 that
a workable scheme was presented. This is the Boneh-Franklin scheme [13] and the hard
number problem on which this system is based is the BDHP. The protocol was originally
designed using the Weil pairing but the Tate pairing can be used instead.
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4.6.1 Identity-Based Encryption
In IBE there is a requirement for a Key Generation Centre (KGC). Its role is to gener-
ate the domain parameters and private keys, which are distributed to Alice and Bob (see
Figure 4.4). The public keys are calculated from the domain parameters and the pub-
licly available identities. The Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme’s [13] security is based on the
Figure 4.4: Identity-Based Encryption
BDHP and it requires four algorithms; setup, extract, encrypt and decrypt. “Setup” gen-
erates the master key, and the domain parameters. “Extract” generates the private key.
“Encrypt” and “Decrypt” are the encryption and decryption algorithm respectively.
Setup The domain parameters are generated by this algorithm. l ∈ Z, of the order of
2160, is chosen. An integer s ∈ Z∗l is multiplied by P ∈ G1 to generate sP . Four
hash functions are chosen;
• h1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1
• h2 : GF (2283×4)→ {0, 1}n
• h3 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → Z∗l
• h4 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
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where n is the length of the message to be encrypted. h1 is a probabilistic algorithm
to calculate a point on the curve. It takes as its input the identity (i.d.) of the
recipient and maps this value to a element of the field GF (2283), which is taken as
x and substituted into Equation (3.44). If the equation holds then it is a point on the
curve, otherwise x is incremented until a point is found which is denoted by Q. This
point is then multiplied by #E/l to get an l-torsion point. All of this information is
public and is placed on the wireless sensor node except the master key, s.
Extract The hash function, h1(i.d.) = Q, is run to map an identity to a point on the
curve. When this value is multiplied by s and the result, sQ, is the private key.
Encrypt In order for Bob to encrypt a message, m ∈ {0, 1}n, which he sends to Alice,
he performs the following steps. ⊕ is the symbol for XOR.
• Q = h1(i.d.)
• random ρ ∈ {0, 1}n
• integer r = h3(ρ,m)
• g = el(Q, sP )r = el(Q,P )rs
• V = ρ⊕ h2(g)
• W = m⊕ h4(ρ)
• U = rP
• Transmits the ciphertext (U, V,W )
Decrypt In order for Alice to decrypt the message, (U, V,W ), which she has received
from Bob, she performs the steps below. Her private key is sQ.
• if U /∈ E then reject ciphertext
• g = el(sQ,U) = el(sQ, rP ) = el(Q,P )rs
• ρ = V ⊕ h2(g)
• m = W ⊕ h4(ρ)
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• r = h3(ρ,m)
• if U 6= rP then reject ciphertext
The security of the scheme is based on the BDHP as the adversary knows Q which is
a point on the curve and so can be written as Q = xP . It also knows U = rP and sP it
cannot be assumed that the domain parameters are a secret. Therefore it has to attempt to
calculate el(P, P )xrs which it should not be able to do.
Over the curve E(GF (2283)), U is 284 bits using point compression. V and W are
the same length as the message, which could be an AES key, the smallest value that this
can be is 128 (see Table 4.4.3). Therefore the total length of the ciphertext is 540 bits.
4.6.2 Identity-Based Signature
The Cha and Cheon Identity-Based Signature (IBS) scheme [17] can be used to digitally
sign the message. This uses the same public domain parameter and private key as the
Boneh-Franklin scheme with an additional hash function, h5 : {0, 1}∗ ×G1 → Z∗l . In
place of encrypt and decrypt, there are two new algorithms; sign and verify.
Sign • pick random t ∈ Z∗l
• U = th1(i.d.) = tQ where Q is the public key of the signing entity
• h = h5(m,U)
• V = (t+ h)sQ where sQ is the private key of the signing entity
• Transmit message, m, and signature (U, V )
Verify • h = h5(m,U)
• Q = h1(i.d.)
• The signature is valid if el(sP, U + hQ) = el(P, V )
This is because
el(sP, U + hQ) = el(sP, (t+ h)Q) = el(P, (t+ h)Q)
s,
el(P, V ) = el(P, (t+ h)sQ) = el(P, (t+ h)Q)
s.
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The signatureU, V will be 568 bits using point compression over the curveE(GF (2283)).
4.6.3 Identity-Based Signcryption
IBE could be used in conjunction with IBS to distribute symmetric keys, or small mes-
sages, in a WSN. Instead, it would be preferable to use signcryption [105] as this results in
less computation and bandwidth usage. An efficient Identity-Based Signcryption (IBSC)
scheme, that is a submission to the identity based public key cryptography IEEE P1363.3
standard, is the BLMQ scheme [7]. In the BLMQ scheme there are four algorithms; setup,
keygen, sign/encrypt and decrypt/verify.
Setup As with the Boneh-Franklin scheme the domain parameters are generated by this
algorithm. Points Q ∈ G2 and P = ψ(Q) ∈ G1 are chosen. A Tate pairing
calculation is run to calculate g = el(P,Q) ∈ µl. A master key, s, that is a random
member of Z∗l is chosen, which generates the system-wide public key, Qpub = sQ.
There are also two hash functions;
• h1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zl
• h2 : {0, 1}∗ × µl → Zl
• h2 : µl → {0, 1}n
Keygen This maps an identity, ID, to a private key SID = 1h1(ID)+s Q.
Sign/Encrypt In order for Bob to sign and encrypt a message, m ∈ {0, 1}n, which he
sends to Alice, he performs the following steps. ⊕ is the symbol for XOR.
• Random x ∈ Z∗l is chosen
• r = gx
• c = m⊕ h3(r)
• h = h2(m, r)
• S = (x+ h)ψ(SIDA)
• T = x(h1(IDB)P + ψ(Qpub))
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• Transmits the ciphertext (c, S, T )
Verify/Decrypt In order for Alice to decrypt the message, (c, S, T ), which she has re-
ceived from Bob, she performs the steps below.
• r = el(T, SIDB)
• m = c⊕ h3(r)
• h = h2(m, r)
• if r 6= el(S, h1(IDA)Q+QPUB)g−h then reject ciphertext
The ciphertext, c, S, T , will be 696 bits using point compression over the curveE(GF (2283))..
This is smaller than would be the result if a signed message is encrypted using IBS and
IBE. Therefore BLMQ IBSC scheme would be the appropriate choice for transmitting a
symmetric key or a small message in a WSN. In the same paper they also introduce an ef-
ficient IBS scheme. The signature on a message m is (h, S) from above, and the message
is only accepted if h = h2(m, el(S, h1(ID)Q+QPUB)g−h)
4.6.4 IBC in a WSN
With IBC the wireless sensor node’s identity can be used as the public key and hence there
is no need for a certificate to bind a wireless sensor node’s identity to its public key. The
base station used to program the wireless sensor nodes could play the role of the KGC in
the network (see Figure 4.5). The steps required for communication from Bob to Alice
are given in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 IBC Data Transfer
1: Bob encrypts message using Alice’s identity.
2: Bob signs encrypted message using its private key.
3: Bob sends encrypted message and digital signature to Alice.
4: Alice decrypts message using private key.
5: Alice verifies digital signature of message using Bob’s public key.
In comparison to the scheme presented in Section 4.5 there is only one radio trans-
mission required, making this approach much more suitable for low energy WSNs. From
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Figure 4.5: IBC deployed in a WSN
Section 2.3 on page 17 it can be seen that the networks will be organised in a multi-hop
fashion. This leads to the conclusion that an IBC scheme will greatly reduce the energy
dissipation in the network. For example, when Alice wants to encrypt a message to Bob
who is ten hops away using a traditional PKI, then Bob’s digital signature would have to
be relayed ten times to Alice via the intermediate wireless sensor nodes, which is not the
case in IBC.
The fact that only wireless sensor nodes that are programmed by the KGC will have
valid private keys guarantees network access control. As even if an adversary asks for a
message to be encrypted to a certain identity, it cannot decrypt the message as it does not
have the private key. Also, it cannot inject a message into the network, as it does not have
a private key to generate a valid signature.
This system is easily scalable, as new wireless sensor nodes only have to be pro-
grammed with the domain parameters and a private key by the KGC before deployment.
4.6.5 Identity-Based Non-Interactive Key Distribution Scheme
Instead of using IBSC to distribute a symmetric session key; the bilinear pairing could
be used generate the key between the wireless sensor nodes. SOK identity-based Non-
Interactive Key Distribution Scheme (NIKDS) was proposed by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasa-
hara [85] and can be implemented using the Tate pairing. If given h1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and
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two devices with identity A and B respectively. Then QA = h1(A) and QB = h1(B)
where QA, QB ∈ G1. The wireless sensor nodes have their private key sQA and sQB
placed on them by the KGC. The symmetric key, kAB, can be calculated by both parties
as;
kAB = el(sQA, QB) = el(QA, QB)
s = el(QA, sQB) (4.7)
4.6.6 Conclusion
From the above it can be seen that an asymmetric encryption protocol is desirable for
distributing symmetric keys in a WSN. Of the asymmetric approaches considered, the
SOK identity-based NIKDS would be the best choice as it does not require any bits to be
transmitted.
4.7 Protocol
The protocol outlined here, for implementing security in a WSN, is designed for a static
network, and uses SOK identity-based NIKDS and BMLQ IBS. The environmental threat
detection in Section 1.2.3 is the target application. In this case the wireless sensor nodes
that are detecting the chemical reagents are given a fixed position. Techniques, such as
those outlined in Section 2.4, are used so that every wireless sensor node can work out
its position. End users have to be able to easily extract data from the network and this
can be achieved using a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) type devices. The protocol uses
identity-based NIKDSand IBS as a method for distributing symmetric keys, and also to
allow devices access to the WSN.
There are four distinct stages to this protocol; prior to deployment, deployment, re-
keying and wireless sensor node addition, and data extraction. Each one of these stages
are outlined below. The wireless sensor nodes themselves are not protected by tamper
resistant hardware as this would increase their cost. Therefore it is possible that data and
keying material on the devices can be extracted. It is assumed that some of the devices will
be compromised in this way, but this number should be less than 10% of the total number
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in the WSN. Also the KGC, which programs the devices, and the PDAs, which extract
information form the WSN, are secure. The users of the network would be able to find out
if a PDA is lost and hence exclude that particular device from any more communication.
In the following, S and V indicate IBS signature generation and verification.
Prior to deployment This part of the protocol is concerned with distributing the do-
main parameters and private keys to the wireless sensor nodes. The elliptic curve
and Galois fields being used are hard coded on the device. For SOK NIKDS
the devices have to be able to calculate KAB = el(sQA, h3(B)). For BLMQ
IBS they have to be able to generate a signature, (h, S), and verify a signature,
h = h2(m, el(S, h1(ID)Q+QPUB)g
−h) (see Section 4.6.3). Therefore the param-
eters that are placed on the devices are
• (h1, h2, Q,QPUB, g)→ NX
• QKGC , QX , sQX → NX
where a generic wireless sensor node is given the identity NX and has public key
QX = h3(NX) and private key sQX . QKGC is the public key of the KGC. Instead
of placing h3 on the device, the hash function is carried out by the programming
device and the point on the curve to which an identity equates to is placed on the
wireless sensor node. For the rest of this section Q∗ represents the identity of the
wireless sensor node and also its public key.
Deployment During this phase symmetric keys are set up between neighbouring wireless
sensor nodes in a pairwise fashion. The wireless sensor nodes would transmit a
small signed message to every device in radio range at time T1. This would means
that devices that can generate a valid signature are permitted to join the network.
They would then generate a pairwise symmetric key, KAB. The wireless sensor
nodes maintain a list of authenticated devices in radio range.
• QA → QB : m||S(m)
• QB : V (m||S(m))
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• QB : KAB = el(sQA, QB).
• Maintain list of wireless sensor nodes in radio range i.e. CB = {QA, QC , QD}
Where KAB is a shared symmetric key between QA and QB, S represents signing
and V represents verification.
wireless sensor node addition At time T3 extra devices may be added to the WSN. At
a previous time, T2, the KGC will broadcast though the network the identity of the
wireless sensor nodes to be added i.e. EKGC = {QO, QP , QQ}. The identities of
these devices, along with a time-stamp, are signed by the KGC. It does this in order
to authenticate these identities and prevent the same message being replayed by an
adversary in the future, that may have extracted private keying material from one of
the wireless sensor nodes in EKGC .
• QKGC → QX : QO||QP ||QQ||T2||(S(QO||QP ||QQ||T2))
• QX : V (QO||QP ||QQ||T2||(SsQKGC (QO||QP ||QQ||T2))
• QX → QA : m||S(m)
• QA : V (m||S(m))
• QA : KAX = el(sQA, QX).
• QA : If QX /∈ CA or EKGC then reject QX else QX ∈ CA
Data extraction In the environmental monitoring scenario, presented in Section 1.2.3,
it is envisaged that the WSN itself would be static, but that the entities extracting
data from the network are mobile. For example, they could be a policeman who
uses a PDA to extract information from the network. The PDA in this case will be
programmed with the same domain parameters as the wireless sensor nodes. Only
wireless sensor nodes authorised by the KGC can join the network; hence the KGC
needs to send a packet that contains the identity of QPDA and is signed by its private
key.
• QKGC → QX : QPDA||S(QPDA)
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• QX : V (QPDA||S(QPDA))
• QX : KXPDA = el(sQX , QPDA).
When a PDA requests a reading, from a certain geographical area, it will diffuse this
request through the network. As its identity QPDA has already been broadcast to the
network as a valid identity, then the wireless sensor node that is elected to send data back
to the PDA can do so using AES. This message and the identity of the source is further
encrypted by the local symmetric key and forwarded toward the extraction point, which
is also known as a sink. It may be symmetrically encrypted and decrypted many times
before the destination is reached.
4.8 Security of the Protocol
The security of this protocol is based on the fact that the WSN, or the portion of it that
takes the measurements, is static. The wireless sensor nodes build up tables of adjacent
wireless sensor nodes with which they can communicate. Upon capture of a device and
the extraction of its keying material then the adversary will only have access to a very
small number of nodes’ data. The utility of a WSN is based on its massively distributed
nature and the fact that many wireless sensor nodes collaborate to give an accurate read-
ing of what is being measured. In this case, the fact that only several wireless sensor
node’s data have been extracted will result in an inaccurate measurement. Another major
advantage to re-keying the WSN regularly is that if a wireless sensor node is captured and
the symmetric key extracted then the adversary will only have access to the previous com-
munications that were encrypted with that particular key. All previous communication is
still secure.
Various different attacks are discussed on the WSN in the following section. They take
the form of erroneous data insertion, routing disruption or attacks to deplete the energy
source of the device.
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4.8.1 Erroneous Data Insertion
A malicious node may introduce erroneous data into the network, but if it is not collab-
orated by another node then the data is disregarded. For example one wireless sensor
node might indicate the presence of a chemical reagent but if other devices, with which it
shares pairwise keys, do not detect the chemical present then the reading is not accepted
as valid. Mechanisms could be put in place such that a number of invalid readings being
detected by two or more wireless sensor nodes will lead to the offending device being
excluded from the WSN.
There is also an attack whereby a compromised wireless sensor node, that is elected to
communicate with the sink, sends erroneous data to this sink. An attack of this nature is
difficult to defend against. One approach is for the wireless sensor nodes in a geographical
area to agree upon a clusterhead wireless sensor node that is responsible for communica-
tion with the sink. This clusterhead could be assigned in a round robin manner, so that in
a group of ten devices they only have one turn every ten transmissions. The identity of the
clusterhead is forwarded, with the message, to wireless sensor nodes along the path to the
PDA. If, along the path, the wireless sensor nodes notice that this identity was the clus-
terhead less than ten transmissions ago then it will drop the packet. A malicious device
could try and forward a message to the sink and spoof a valid clusterhead identity but this
is not feasible, as it will not have the symmetric key associated with the spoofed identity.
4.8.2 Sinkhole Attack
In a sinkhole attack, a compromised device advertises a high quality route to a data extrac-
tion point, when it is not near one. This causes data to be routed to this malicious wireless
sensor node, which can then drop the packets. As the wireless sensor nodes are aware of
their position, this attack can be easily countered. If the device injects false routing infor-
mation, to say that it is close to a distant area of the network, then as the wireless sensor
nodes in the next hop are aware of their own position they will know that this could not
be the case, and drop the packet. Also, if routing information is replayed from another
section of the network then the receiving device will ignore the communication as the
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device from which the routing information originally is not a member of CX , where X is
the wireless sensor node’s identity.
4.8.3 Wormhole Attack
The wormhole attack [46] is where two devices, that are not wireless sensor nodes, and are
geographically distant, conspire with each other to provide a low latency, undetectable (to
the other devices in the WSN) route between them. For example the PDA or sink might
request information from a certain location in the WSN known as a source. This request
is distributed in a multi-hop fashion through the network. If the area of interest is ten hops
away (see Figure 4.6) and there is a wormhole between device two and device seven then
wireless sensor node eight believes that it is two hops from the sink. All communication
between the source and sink would go through this wormhole as it appears to be a short
path to the sink. The adversary could exploit this traffic to drop packets. The protocol
Figure 4.6: A representative wormhole attack: there is a wormhole between the two
devices highlighted in red
defends against this attack as wireless sensor node eight will not accept a message from
wireless sensor node one, as it is not in the list of devices that it can communicate with.
4.8.4 Sybil Attack
Sybil attacks [26] can be mounted by compromised devices. In this attack the wireless
sensor nodes present multiple identities to neighbouring devices in order to disrupt rout-
ing, or provide multiple readings to the network to make the local aggregated data value
erroneous. Under the protocol presented, this attack is no longer feasible, as during nor-
mal operation the wireless sensor nodes only accept packets from their neighbours in
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CX . During the wireless sensor node addition phase they will only accept communica-
tion from devices in CX or EKGC . Even if the Sybil identity presented is a member of
EKGC it cannot join the network as it does not have a private key for network access.
4.8.5 Identity Replication Attack
Unlike the Sybil attack, the identity replication attack [70] is based upon giving the same
identity to different physical devices. This attack can be mounted because in a WSN there
is no way to know that a wireless sensor node is compromised. If this device is cloned
and placed in different parts of the network with the intention of disrupting the routing
protocols then this attack can be overcome with the security protocol. Since the wireless
sensor nodes are only allowed to communicate with other devices that are a member of
CX or EKGC . Hence, if a device were moved to another part of the network it would
not be able to join the WSN at that point. A variation on this attack would be for many
cloned devices to be replaced in the same location from which the wireless sensor node
was originally taken. The aim of this attack might be to use up all the available bandwidth
or inject many erroneous data readings into the network. The medium access control
function of the link layer will prevent this type of attack as the wireless sensor nodes
could be given access to the medium in a round robin fashion.
4.8.6 Energy Depletion Attack
Adversaries could mount energy depletion attacks. The aim of this attack would be to
deplete the battery of the wireless sensor nodes in order to destroy the network. Attacks
of this nature can take various forms; they can be carried out by devices that have been
compromised but also by entities claiming to be a member of the WSN. As during normal
operation the wireless sensor nodes only accept data from their immediate neighbours,
these attacks would have to be carried out during the wireless sensor node addition phase
or when the devices communicate with a sink.
During the wireless sensor node addition phase of the protocol an external adversary,
which is a device that does not have valid keying material, could attempt to access the
68
Security Considerations in a WSN
network. It cannot join the WSN as it does not have a valid private key, but the aim of
the attack is to make the wireless sensor nodes perform this verification step and so waste
energy. Also a compromised device that mounts this attack cannot join the network as it
is only a member of CX at the geographical location from where it was taken. This attack
cannot be defended against but systems can be put in place to limit its damage. As the
wireless sensor nodes knows the number of devices in EKGC , they will only be expecting
to receive a maximum number of transmissions, anymore and its knows that there is an
attack taking place. By setting the maximum number of transmissions that a device can
receive to be the number in CX , in this phase of the protocol, then this should prevent the
attack from succeeding.
In normal operation all the wireless sensor nodes receive their data from devices that
are a member of their group, i.e. QX ∈ CX . There are also occasions that they have
to interpret a broadcast message from outside the static WSN, such as from the KGC or
from a sink. This is an obvious target for mounting an energy dissipation attack. An
adversary could pretend to be the KGC and ask for several wireless sensor node identities
to be added to the WSN. Of course, this would be refused as it would be able to sign
the message, but it would lead to a dissipation of the battery on the devices performing
the verification algorithm. One way to limit the damage of this attack would be to only
allow a small number of the wireless sensor nodes to access data from outside the WSN
at any one time, and also the addition of devices can only occur at predetermined times.
Simulation is required to ascertain the smallest percentage of wireless sensor nodes that
must be available to accept external data.
4.9 Software profile of the Protocol
In this thesis, in order to evaluate whether a protocol based on SOK identity-based NIKDS
and BMLQ IBSis an appropriate choice for a WSN, the most computationally demand-
ing components are implemented in software using the curve E(GF (2283)) = y2 + y ≡
x3 + x+ 1 and the Miracl library [90]. The components that are profiled are exponentia-
tion, point multiplication and the Tate pairing. In Table 4.9 the Tate pairing contribution
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to the total is counted twice as it is used in signature verification and symmetric key gen-
eration. The target device is the ARM920T [5] as this is a device that could be used
on a wireless sensor node. The platform used to obtain these measurements is shown in
Figure 4.7. The code used to implement the scheme was compiled for the ARM using
A6302/AM 503B
TDS 210
ARM920T
V
PC running ARM ADS v1.2
JTAG
Null modem cable
Figure 4.7: Experimental setup for measuring time and energy of the ibe protocol [57]
the ARM Development Suite (ADS) v1.2. As well as generating an executable that can
be downloaded to the ARM using the JTAG inputs, it also gives timing figures for these
executables. The wire into the core is split in two and one branch is wrapped around the
Tektronix A6302 current probe amplifier that is connected to the Tektronix TDS 210 os-
cilloscope. The C code is written so that the code for which the current is to be measured
is a large loop that triggers the oscilloscope every iteration through the GPIO. The output
from the oscilloscope is captured for analysis on a PC. The instantaneous current, i(t),
is captured and must be multiplied by the voltage, VDD, and integrated over the program
execution time, T , to obtain the energy, E, as given in Equation (4.8). The voltage over
which the measurements are taken is 2.5V and the frequency is 140MHz.
E = VDD
∫ T
0
i(t)dt (4.8)
The total energy dissipated is 35.4mJ and the power consumed is 0.05W at 140 MHz.
The time required to run the protocol algorithm at 200 MHz is 444.5ms. Due to the nature
of the experimental setup these figures are a lower bound of the energy dissipated by these
component parts, as it has been assumed that the current through both branches going into
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code algorithm time (ms) energy (mJ)
tate (×2) el(P,Q) 177.1 14.1
power gx 39.8 3.2
mult rQ 50.6 4.0
Total 444.5 35.4
Table 4.2: Timing and energy figures for main components of the protocol
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Figure 4.8: Time required for main components of the protocol
the device is equal when this cannot be the case. The current going through the branch that
is measured would be smaller due to greater area and length of the wire, thus the energy
and power figures should be higher than provided. The energy measurements should be
taken at 200 MHz as this will be he clock speed of the final system. This could not be
achieved as the fastest clock speed that the board can run at is 140 MHz. It is can be seen
that a software implementation requires too much energy and its latency is unacceptably
large for implementation on a wireless sensor node, therefore a hardware implementation
of this scheme should be investigated.
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Figure 4.9: Energy required for main components of the protocol
From analysis of the figures and the table in this section it is clear that the Tate pairing
calculation is the most computationally demanding component of the protocol. It requires
14.1mJ to run which is considerable when the total energy budget of the wireless sensor
nodes is of the order of 1000J . A key design goal of wireless sensor nodes is that they
operate on a low duty cycle and the fact that the Tate pairing takes 177.1ms is counter to
this goal. A hardware implementation of the Tate pairing is therefore merited, and it will
reduce the time it requires and also the energy it dissipates.
4.10 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter a discussion of the efficacy of various approaches to providing security in
a WSN is presented. It is concluded that a symmetric scheme is the appropriate choice for
communication due to the limited energy resource of the network, though the deployment
of symmetric keys in the WSN is a challenging problem. Pre-deployed keys are not
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appropriate for reasons of security and also, in the case of pairwise keys, their failure to
scale. It is argued that the symmetric keys should be distributed through the WSN using
an asymmetric protocol.
As one of the criteria for adopting a particular protocol for security is that it minimises
energy dissipation it is evident that, of the asymmetric schemes available, those based on
an elliptic curve are the best choice. This is because the key sizes for these schemes
are four to six times smaller than for example RSA, and hence the radio is required to
transmit fewer bits. It has been shown that a IBC scheme is preferable to a ECC one
because, it does not require the transmission of digital certificates and there is a simple
non-interactive process for generating symmetric keys.
A protocol that uses BMLQ IBS and SOK identity-based NIKDS is presented. This
protocol performs a number of functions; authenticates network access, distributes local
symmetric keys and provides a mechanism for the WSN to communicate securely with
a sink. Standard attacks on a WSN are also described. The fact that it is assumed that
wireless sensor nodes know their own position, and also the nature of the protocol, enables
the WSN to defend itself against these attacks.
This work is similar to the approach presented in [104], in that it also uses location in
its security mechanisms. The security of their system is based on the fact that a network
master secret, that is used to generate location based keys, is kept secret for a minimum
time. This is the time that it is believed that an adversary would require to access this
key if in control of the wireless sensor node. When the wireless sensor nodes have all
calculated their location based keys then this network master secret is securely erased.
Additional devices added to the network will require access to this network master secret.
This scheme’s security depends upon keeping this network master secret secure, whereas
the one presented in this chapter assumes that the adversary can access a proportion of the
wireless sensor nodes private keying material and will still function as a secure WSN.
The proposed protocol has not been validated on either a wireless sensor node system
or a simulation environment. This was not done at this stage as it unclear whether or not
the protocol could be implemented on a device that is very constrained in terms of its
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energy resources. In order to investigate whether or not the protocol can be implemented
in a WSN the most computationally parts of the protocol are profiled in software. A
characteristic two version is profiled, targeting an ARM920T, in terms of time and energy.
The figures indicate that a software implementation will be too costly in terms of energy
and time. Therefore a hardware implementation is warranted. From the profiling results
it can be seen that the Tate pairing should be implemented in dedicated hardware in order
to reduce the running time and energy required for the protocol. In the following chapters
a co-processor for the Tate pairing is designed, implemented and evaluated to ascertain if
the scheme presented in this chapter could be implemented on a wireless sensor node.
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5.1 Introduction
From the discussion in Chapter 4 it is clear that the Tate pairing contributes over 66% to
the total energy and run-time of the protocol based on IBC. For this reason it is a suitable
candidate for hardware acceleration. A hardware accelerator will be implemented as a
peripheral device on an ARM system [5]. The reasons a 32-bit processor was decided
upon is that an algorithm run on a 32-bit machine will be much faster than one run on
an 8-bit machine, such as the Atmel ATmega 128L used for MICA2. Therefore a lower
voltage can be used, and as energy used is proportional to the square of voltage, there is a
considerable saving in energy.
5.2 Design Considerations
The hardware accelerator will be implemented in CMOS technology and it is important
that due consideration is taken of the design goals which can be summarised as low energy
and low cost.
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5.2.1 Circuit Energy Dissipation
Before a discussion on how to reduce digital energy dissipation, it is instructive to review
the main areas of energy consumption in CMOS digital circuitry. For the total average
energy, Eavg, there are three main components;
Eavg = Edynamic + Estatic (5.1)
where Edynamic is dynamic energy, Eshort is short circuit energy and Estatic is static en-
ergy. These components will be described in the following sections.
5.2.1.1 Dynamic Energy Consumption
In CMOS circuits the mechanism that consumes the most energy is charging and dis-
charging of the capacitive load [77]. A device such as an inverter can be modelled as
two resisters, a switch and a capacitor (see Figure 5.1). This capacitance is a result of the
parasitic capacitance of the device itself, the interconnect and the load that the device is
connected to.
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Figure 5.1: Dynamic Charging and Discharging a Capacitive Load [57]
The capacitance, CL, is charged when the p-channel Metal Oxide Silicon (PMOS)
device is on, and the resistance of the PMOS device is modelled by Rc. The current
charging the capacitive load is ic. As the capacitor is charged the energy used EVDD is
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given by,
EVDD =
∫ ∞
0
VDDicdt
= CLVDD
∫ ∞
0
dvc
dt
dt
= CLVDD
∫ VDD
0
dvc
= CLV
2
DD
(5.2)
Half of this energy is stored in the capacitor, Ecap, and the rest is dissipated in the
resistor Rc
Ecap =
∫ ∞
0
vcicdt
= CL
∫ ∞
0
vc
dvc
dt
dt
= CL
∫ VDD
0
vcdvc
=
1
2
CLV
2
DD
(5.3)
When the n-channel Metal Oxide Silicon (NMOS) device is active for the logic tran-
sition from one to zero then the capacitor is discharged through the NMOS device whose
resistance is given by Rd. The energy in the capacitor Ecap is dissipated as heat. Therefore
in a charge / discharge cycle the total energy dissipated is EVDD .
If the probability that a node transitions from zero to one in a particular clock cycle is
given by α, then the average energy dissipated by this node in a clock cycle is Enode dyn.
Enode dyn = CLV
2
DDα (5.4)
For a complete circuit then the total dynamic energy consumed, Etotal dyn (5.5), is the sum
of the energy consumed in the individual nodes multiplied by the number of clock cycles
, Ncycle, required to carry out the required processing.
Etotal dyn =
(∑
i
CiV
2
DDαi
)
Ncycle (5.5)
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The total power consumed for a certain frequency, f , is,
Ptotal dyn =
(∑
i
CiV
2
DDαi
)
Ncyclef (5.6)
From an analysis of Equation (5.5) it can seen that reducing the voltage will have the
greatest effect on Etotal dyn. If voltage, VDD, is reduced then this increases the delay of
the device, T (see Equation (5.7)), and this might result in the latency of the design being
violated. To fix this violation the techniques of parallelism or pipelining can be employed.
In the case were the design is made more parallel this will lead to an increase in area, and
hence capacitance, but as this is a linear term in equation (5.5) there is always a reduction
in the overall energy used.
T =
CL
µCox
2
W
L
VDD
(VDD − Vt)2 (5.7)
Other approaches to reduce Etotal dyn is to gate signals to a known value when they
are not required. This has the effect to making α equal to zero. The gating technique
can be utilised in the datapath or more commonly the clock is gated to logic zero when a
particular module is not required. As the clock tree can consume 30% of total power [69]
this technique can lead to considerable savings. Glitching of a circuit is undesirable, but
it is unavoidable, it should be reduced as much as possible by using balanced paths in the
datapath. Finally, a reduction in the number of clock cycles an algorithm takes to execute
will reduce the energy consumed.
5.2.1.2 Short-Circuit Energy Consumption
Due to the finite slope of the input waveform driving a CMOS circuit there is a point at
which both the NMOS and PMOS transistors are on. This means that there is a direct path
between VDD and ground - i.e. a short circuit. The short circuit current is represented in
Figure 5.2. Equation (5.8) for the the average energy dissipated by this node in a clock
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Figure 5.2: CMOS Inverter Short-Circuit Current [57]
cycle is derived from Figure 5.2 and is given by,
Enode sho =
(
VDD
Ipeakτ
2
+ VDD
Ipeakτ
2
)
α
= VDDIpeakτα
(5.8)
where the probability that a node transitions from zero to one in a particular clock cycle is
given by α, τ is the time both transistors are on and Ipeak is the peak short circuit current.
As in section 5.2.1.1 the total energy consumed, Etotal sho (5.9), is the sum of the
individual nodes multiplied by the number of clock cycles , Ncycle, required to carry out
the required processing.
Etotal sho =
(∑
i
VDDIpeakταi
)
Ncycle (5.9)
Short circuit power can be kept within the bound of 10% of the dynamic power if
the rise and fall times of inputs and outputs are the same [77]. Techniques for reducing
dynamic power will also help in reducing the short circuit power, as will matching input
signal rise and output signal fall times.
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5.2.1.3 Static Energy Consumption
When a CMOS device is in its steady state it ideally should not be conducting current,
though in practice this is not the case. There are two main sources of leakage current;
reverse biased diode junction current and sub-threshold current. In a Taiwan Semicon-
ductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) [98] 65nm low power process employed in this
work the leakage power is two orders of magnitude less than the dynamic power compo-
nents. Therefore, static energy consumption is a secondary concern of the work. But for
completeness we have reviewed static power consumption.
Reverse biased diode junction current arises between the source or drain and the sub-
strate (see figure 5.3). The current, due to this effect, can be modelled using the following
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Figure 5.3: Diode Leakage Current in a CMOS Inverter [57]
formula for a reverse biased PN-junction,
Ileakage jun = Is
(
e
VDD
VT − 1
)
(5.10)
where VDD is the voltage across the junction, VT is the thermal voltage and Is is the
saturation current [77].
The other source of leakage current is due to the current that flows when the voltage
from gate to source, VGS , is less than the threshold voltage, Vt, and is given by,
Ileakage sub = I0We
 −Vt
nVT
(
1− e−
VDD
VT
)
(5.11)
where I0 and n are empirically derived, VT is the thermal voltage, W is the gate width,
VDD is the supply voltage and Vt is the threshold voltage [56]. This component is gaining
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in importance. For as VDD is reduced with migration to smaller technologies then Vt is
also reduced, and this leads to a higher sub-threshold current in the CMOS device.
The total energy dissipated by these two components is
Eleakage = 1/f(Ileakage sub + Ileakage jun)VDDNcycle (5.12)
where f is the frequency of operation of the circuit and Ncycle is the number of clock
cycles required for the operation.
An effective method for reducing static power consumption is to use power gating;
turning off portions of the design as and when they are not needed. This is achieved by
pulling the power rails from VDD and the ground to open by using large pull down / pull up
transistors. Another technique is to use Multiple Threshold Complementary Metal Oxide
Silicon (MTCMOS) whereby devices in the critical path have a low threshold voltage and
hence are fast but consume a lot of static energy, whereas other devices not in the critical
path have a larger threshold voltage [102].
5.2.2 Cost
As discussed above the cost of the wireless sensor node is of primary importance; it will
be impossible to deploy large numbers of these devices in a network if they cost much
more than one dollar and are expensive to deploy. Therefore the design, manufacturing
and deployment costs must be kept to a minimum.
The cost of an Integrated Circuit (IC) [77] can be given by,
cost per IC = variable cost per IC +
fixed cost
volume
(5.13)
The fixed cost or non-recurring engineering charge is the amount of capital required to
design the IC. This can be broken down into the cost of the engineers, cost of the Com-
puter Aided Design (CAD) software and ancillary costs such as offices etc. Of these costs
the engineers contribute the most to the fixed cost, and so it is paramount to reduce the
number of engineering man-hours required to complete a project. This could be achieved
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by using productive engineers and employing the best CAD tools and flows to reduce the
number of engineering man-hours required. The approach to IC design that is normally
used is standard cell design as this allows an engineer to design and verify a very large
IC that would not be possible using a full custom design flow. The fixed cost could also
include the cost of buying soft or hard Intellectual Property (IP) from third parties that
can be incorporated into the IC. From Equation (5.13) it can be seen that the fixed cost as
a percentage of the overall IC cost reduces as the volume of production increases.
The variable cost can be seen as the cost of manufacturing the IC and is given by
Equation (5.14) [77]
variable cost =
cost of die test + cost of packaging + cost of die
final test yield
(5.14)
The cost of testing the die is related to how long the die must remain on the tester machine.
These machines can cost millions of dollars so a short test time means that more dies
can be tested per minute and therefore the cost of the machine can be spread over more
ICs. The way to reduce time on the tester is reduce the number of test patterns that are
required to cover 95 - 98% of the stuck at faults. The economic benefits of design for test
are discussed in [16].
A plastic package is more expensive than a ceramic package and can dissipate heat
up to two watts [77]. Therefore as long as the heat dissipation of the circuit can be kept
below this figure then a plastic package would suffice, and thus help to reduce the variable
cost.
The cost of the die is a function of die area as given by Equation (5.15). Dies per
wafer is the area of the wafer divided by the area of a die and die yield is the percentage
of good dies on the wafer. This latter term is inversely proportional to the cube of die
area, therefore the cost of the die is actually a function of the forth power of area.
cost of die =
cost of wafer
dies per wafer × die yield (5.15)
It should be noted that when designing a system there is a cost in area for algorithms that
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are implemented in software as they will have to be stored in flash memory.
The final aspect of cost that needs to be addressed is the issue of ease of use for the
people deploying the network. There would be not much point in designing a low cost
sensor if it was costly to deploy. This means that the wireless sensor nodes should have
hardware and software that enables them to establish a secure network without interaction
with the person deploying the network. Of course, whoever is using the wireless sensor
nodes will have to program their application onto the devices but this should be made as
simple as possible.
5.2.3 Conclusion
For a design of this nature there is no real time constraint and so there can not be a
latency that has to be met. Power is not important to this design, what is critical is the
amount of energy that the device consumes. As a Lithium battery has a energy density
of 2880J/cm3, which translates into 90µW/cm3/year [83], then this figure of 2880J
could be used as an energy constraint. It has been discussed previously that the device
must operate on a low duty cycle to conserve energy; this requires a circuit that completes
its operation quickly. At the same time the device should be as cheap as possible, and
this would mean that the techniques of parallelism might not be appropriate as they will
increase the area and hence the cost. Finally, when the circuit is operating it should
consume as little energy as possible. These sometimes conflicting design goals of latency,
area and energy are combined into a single metric known as area*energy*time which will
be used to evaluate the circuits outlined in this chapter.
5.3 Architecture for wireless sensor node
Taking into account the preceding discussion a suitable architecture for a wireless sensor
node is proposed in this thesis (see Figure 5.4). The key components to this SoC are the
radio, sensor and digital computation sub-systems. The device as envisaged will have a
fixed sensor attached to it and so its application areas will be restricted. It is unlikely that
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the wireless sensor node’s mission will be fixed; therefore a hardwired ASIC approach
would not be justified. Instead the device should contain a processor so that it could be
programmed for different applications whilst still using the same sensor. From the discus-
Figure 5.4: Architecture of a wireless sensor node
sion about cost (see section 5.2.2) the wireless sensor node should have as small an area as
possible and still be a low energy / low power device. Therefore the number of peripherals
and memory required by the device should be kept to a minimum. The design has to have
persistent memory in the form of NOR flash for storing the code for running the wireless
sensor node and also for storing measurements from the sensor. There is also SRAM for
running the programs. A Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART) is pro-
vided for the purpose of programming the devices before deployment. In order to free
up the CPU a DMA is incorporated in the design. This will allow direct access from
the sensor and radio to the memory. As well as the standard block such as timers, clock
extraction and interrupt controller; there is a power management block whose function is
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to shut down blocks when they are not required. Finally, there is a security accelerator or
crypto engine for implementing computationally demanding cryptography algorithms. It
is in this block that the Tate pairing is instantiated.
5.4 Design Methodology
As a first step the algorithms are implemented in C++ using the Miracl library . This is
in order to check that the algorithms are correct and to generate “golden” files that can be
used in the verification of the hardware. An Algorithmic State Machine (ASM) diagram
is written for the algorithm [14]. From this diagram a datapath circuit can be extracted.
These first two diagrams are then used to write an ASM diagram for the control logic. The
design can then be captured by Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description
Language (VHDL) using the diagram for the datapath and the ASM for the control logic.
The Register Transfer Level (RTL) code is verified using the Modelsim simulator with
random data input and the “golden” output files generated by the C++ model. Synthesis
and physical synthesis is performed using Synopsys Design Compiler and Physical Com-
piler, respectively. The target technology is a TSMC 65nm low power CMOS process
[98]. Worst case operating conditions are used and these are; voltage 1.08V, process
1.000 and temperature 125◦C. It is synthesised for a clock of frequency of 125MHz, or a
clock period of 8ns.
Following synthesis a Standard Parasitic Exchange Format (SPEF) file is extracted
from Physical Compiler. This is converted into a Standard Delay Format (SDF) file using
PrimeTime. A back-annotated VHDL netlist is then simulated using Modelsim to gen-
erate a Value Change Dump (VCD) file. The VHDL netlist, SPEF file and VCD file are
used by PrimePower to arrive at a figure for the power consumption of the circuit. Clock
power was not included in this figure. All of the above steps enable the area, latency,
power and energy of the circuits to be measured.
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5.5 Arithmetic Operations
All operations that are used for the various algorithms in the hardware accelerator take
place in binary extension fields; either GF (2283) or GF (2283×4). If the Tate pairing cal-
culation is rewritten as in Algorithm 6, then the arithmetic operations that are required
are addition, multiplication, and inversion in both fields. In addition, a circuit is required
Algorithm 6 η Algorithm [59, 6]
P = (xp, yp), Q = (xq, yq) : P,Q ∈ GF (2283)
C(x) = c3x
3 + c2x
2 + c1x+ c0 = 1 : C(x) ∈ GF (2283×4)
for i = 1 to 283 do
xp = x
2
p
yp = y
2
p
z = xp + xq
w = z + xpxq + yp + yq + 1
C(x) = C(x)(w + zx+ (z + 1)x2)
xq = x
2283−1
q
yq = y
2283−1
q
end for
return C(x) = C(x)22×283−1
to perform the squaring and square root operations in GF (2283), and exponentiation in
GF (2283×4). How these functions are implemented in hardware is outlined below.
In the subfield GF (2) addition is carried out using modulo two arithmetic, and hence
can be performed in hardware using an XOR gate. Addition is equivalent to subtraction
in GF (2). Also, multiplication is performed using an AND gate in hardware.
The polynomial basis representation is used for the elements of the two finite field
such that for α ∈ GF (2283)
α = A(x) = a282x
282 + a281x
281 + · · ·+ a1x1 + a0 (mod f(x)),
∀aj ∈ GF (2).
(5.16)
When α ∈ GF (2283×4) then
α = A(x) = a3x
3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0 (mod p(x)),
∀aj ∈ GF (2283).
(5.17)
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A NIST [71] recommended irreducible polynomial such as
f(x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1, (5.18)
could be used to generate the field GF (2283) as this lead to 80 bit security level for the
DLP. A better polynomial to use would be
f(x) = x283 + x119 + x97 + x93 + 1, (5.19)
as an odd exponent polynomial means that the square root operation can be carried out in
one clock cycle (see Section 5.5.5.1).
The polynomial for generating GF (2283×4) is
p(x) = x4 + x+ 1, (5.20)
and it is defined over GF (2283).
5.5.1 Addition
Addition in a binary extension field is trivial to implement in hardware. It is an array
of XOR gates, one for every two bits of the operands that are to be added. Hence for
GF (2283) 283 XOR gates are required, and for GF (2283×4) 1132 are required.
5.5.2 Multiplication in GF (2283)
One of the main reasons that WSNs will be deployed is because the devices that make
up the network will be cheap. In term of multiplication in GF (2283) a fast bit-parallel
multiplier is approximately 300,000 gates in area. This would be prohibitive in terms of
manufacturing cost for a wireless sensor node. Thus, a bit-serial approach to designing the
multiplier is warranted. There are two approaches to a bit-serial multiplier – an MSB–first
design or LSB–first design [61].
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5.5.2.1 The MSB–first multiplier
The MSB–first multiplier is based on the following observation.
C(x) = A(x)B(x)
= (a282x
282 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0)(b282x282 + · · ·+ b1x+ b0) (mod f(x))
= b0 + x(b1A(x) + · · ·x(b280A(x) + x(b281A(x) + (xb282A(x)) (mod f(x)))
(5.21)
This multiplier will require 283 clock cycles in order to complete – see Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 MSB Multiplication in GF (2283)
Require: C(x) = A(x)B(x) (mod f(x))
C(x) = 0
count = 0
while count < 282 do
if B(282) = 1 then
C(x) = C(x) + A(x)
end if
left shift B(x)
C(x) = xC(x) (mod f(x))
count = count+ 1
end while
if B(282) = 1 then
C(x) = C(x) + A(x)
end if
return C(x)
The ASM chart for the algorithm of the MSB multiplier, mult msb, is shown in figure
A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 5.5. Signals that are
not read or driven in this diagram are inputs and outputs to the control logic, respectively.
And the control logic is represented by the ASM chart and A.4 in Appendix A. This is
true for all the datapath diagrams in this thesis.The datapath width is 283 bits wide and
is indicated by n in the diagram, and the datapath width will always be 283 bits unless
otherwise stated in all other datapath diagrams.
From Table 5.5.2.3 it can be seen that the area of the MSBmultiplier (mult msb) is
10001 gates with a silicon area of 0.024mm2. It has a latency of 2.32µs and consumes
3.94nJ of energy.
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Figure 5.5: mult msb: Datapath circuit for the MSB multiplier in GF (2283)
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5.5.2.2 The LSB–first multiplier
Another approach to bit-serial multiplication in GF (2283) is to use a LSB first multiplier.
The LSB–first multiplier is based on the following observation.
C(x) = A(x)B(x)
= (a282x
282 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0)(b282x282 + · · ·+ b1x+ b0) (mod f(x))
= (b282x
282A(x) + · · ·+ b1xA(x) + b0A(x)) (mod f(x))
= (b282x
282A(x) (mod f(x))) + · · ·
+ (b1xA(x) (mod f(x))) + (b0A(x) (mod f(x)))
(5.22)
C(x) can be calculated using a shift and add algorithm where the first partial product is
b0A(x). B(x) is then shifted right one bit while at the same time A(x) is multiplied by
x and reduced mod f(x). It is added to the previous product if b1 is equal to one. The
algorithm will terminate when the value of the right shift register is equal to zero (see
Algorithm 8). This is an early exit mechanism, as it could finish after one clock cycle or
283 clock cycles. From Table 5.5.2.3 it can be seen that the area of the LSB multiplier
(mult lsb1) is 8992 gates with a silicon area of 0.022mm2. It has a latency of 2.31µs and
consumes 4.46nJ of energy. Therefore, this multiplier has 11% less area and uses 13%
more energy than the MSB multiplier. Using the area*energy*time metric it can be seen
that the differences between the two approaches is less than 1%.
Algorithm 8 LSB Multiplication in GF (2283)
Require: C(x) = A(x)B(x) (mod f(x))
C(x) = 0
while B(x) 6= 0 do
C(x) = C(x) + b0A(x)
right shift B(x)
A(x) = xA(x) (mod f(x))
end while
From an analysis of the algorithm it can seen that the addition of right shift and linear
feedback barrel shift registers can be used to improve the performance of the circuit.
Two, three, four or five consecutive zero bits are searched for, and the registers shifted
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accordingly. As there is a cost in terms of extra area for every extra bit searched for, it
was decided that five would be the most bits considered. This is because the probability
of five zeros is 1
32
which is quite high.
The ASM charts for the LSB multiplier algorithm and the control logic are shown in
figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 5.6. When
the system is complete, clock tree gating will be implemented at a higher level to reduce
the energy being dissipated on the clock nets.
5.5.2.3 Conclusion
From an analysis of the multipliers presented in Table 5.5.2.3, where mult lsb2 represents
the search for the two LSB being zero etc., it can be seen that mult lsb3 has the lowest
area*energy*time figure. This is the multiplier that is used in this work.
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
mult lsb1 8992 0.022 2.31 289 1.93 4.46 2.24
mult lsb2 9671 0.023 1.897 237 2.23 4.23 1.87
mult lsb3 10217 0.025 1.776 222 2.33 4.14 1.8
mult lsb4 10925 0.026 1.717 215 2.37 4.06 1.83
mult lsb5 11713 0.028 1.708 214 2.43 4.15 2.01
mult msb 10001 0.024 2.32 290 1.7 3.94 2.22
Table 5.1: Results for multiplication in GF (2283)
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Figure 5.6: mult lsb: Datapath circuit for the LSB multiplier in GF (2283)
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5.5.3 Multiplication in GF (2283×4)
In this section the approach taken to multiplication of two elements
γ = αβ, ∀α, β ∈ GF (2283×4)
is outlined.
As the multiplication circuitry will exist for GF (2283), it can be used to perform the
multiplication for GF (2283×4) using Karatsuba and Ofman’s algorithm [50]. This sharing
of resources will lead to a decrease in the monetary cost of the system.
As the elements are represented using the polynomial basis (5.17). Then the multipli-
cation is as follows.
(
3∑
i=0
cix
i
)
=
(
3∑
i=0
aix
i
)(
3∑
i=0
bix
i
)
(mod p(x)) (5.23)
If normal polynomial multiplication is employed, and the terms reduced mod p(x),
then this would result in
C(x) = (a0b0 + a1b3 + a3b1 + a2b2)
+ (a0b1 + a1b0 + a1b3 + a2b2 + a2b3 + a3b1 + a3b2)x
+ (a0b2 + a1b1 + a2b0 + a2b3 + a3b2 + a3b3)x
2
+ (a0b3 + a1b2 + a2b1 + a3b0 + a3b3)x
3 (mod p(x))
(5.24)
and therefore requires sixteen multiplications and fifteen additions inGF (2283). However,
by using the Karatsuba algorithm [50, 72] the number of multiplications can be reduced.
The two operands A(x), B(x) ∈ GF (2283×4) are written as,
A(x) = x2(a3x+ a2) + (a1x+ a0) = x
2Ah + Al,
B(x) = x2(b3x+ b2) + (b1x+ b0) = x
2Bh +Bl.
(5.25)
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The Karatsuba algorithm partial products are,
D1 = AlBl,
D2 = (Al + Ah)(Bl +Bh),
D3 = AhBh,
(5.26)
and hence
C(x) = A(x)B(x) = (x2Ah + Al)(x
2Bh +Bl),
= x4AhBh + x
2AhBl + x
2AlBh + AlBl,
= x4D3 + x
2(D2 −D1 −D3) +D1 (mod p(x)).
(5.27)
The Karatsuba algorithm can be applied recursively to D1, D2 and D3 such that
D1 = AlBl = (a1x+ a0)(b1x+ b0),
= (Ah1x+ Al1)(Bh1x+Bl1) (mod p(x)).
(5.28)
The partial products are
D11 = Al1Bl1 = a0b0,
D12 = (Al1 + Ah1)(Bl1 +Bh1) = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1),
D13 = Ah1Bh1 = a1b1,
(5.29)
therefore
D1 = x
2D13 + x(D12 −D11 −D13) +D11
= x2a1b1 + x((a0 + a1)(b0 + b1)− a0b0 − a1b1) + a0b0 (mod p(x)).
(5.30)
The same technique can be used for D2
D2 = (Al + Ah)(Bl +Bh) = ((a1 + a3)x+ (a0 + a2))((b1 + b3)x+ (b0 + b2))
= (Ah2x+ Al2)(Bh2x+Bl2) (mod p(x)).
(5.31)
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The partial products are
D21 = Al2Bl2 = (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2),
D22 = (Al2 + Ah2)(Bl2 +Bh2) = (a0 + a2 + a1 + a3)(b0 + b2 + b1 + b3),
D23 = Ah2Bh2 = (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3),
(5.32)
therefore
D2 = x
2D23 + x(D22 −D21 −D23) +D21
= x2(a1 + a3)(b1 + b3) + x((a0 + a2 + a1 + a3)(b0 + b2 + b1 + b3)
− (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2)− (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3))
+ (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2) (mod p(x)).
(5.33)
Finally we find for D3
D3 = AhBh = (a3x+ a2)(b3x+ b2)
= (Ah3x+ Al3)(Bh3x+Bl3) (mod p(x)).
(5.34)
The Karatsuba algorithm partial products are
D31 = Al3Bl3 = a2b2,
D32 = (Al3 + Ah3)(Bl3 +Bh3) = (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3),
D33 = Ah3Bh3 = a3b3,
(5.35)
therefore
D3 = x
2D33 + x(D32 −D33 −D33) +D33
= x2a3b3 + x((a2 + a3)(b2 + b3)− a2b2 − a3b3) + a2b2 (mod p(x)).
(5.36)
For the partial multiplication products 9 multiplications and 10 additions are required in
GF (2283).
Substituting the values for D1 ,D2 and D3 into equation (5.27) and reducing the resul-
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tant equation mod p(x) leads to the following
c0 = a2b2 + (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3) + a0b0 + a3b3 + a1b1,
c1 = (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3) + (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3) + (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) + a0b0,
c2 = (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3) + a1b1 + (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2) + a0b0,
c3 = a0b0 + (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) + a1b1 + (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2)
+ (a0 + a2 + a1 + a3)(b0 + b2 + b1 + b3)
+ (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3) + a2b2 + (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3).
(5.37)
Using terms common to more than one equation i.e. a0b0 + a1b1 it can be seen that
12 additions are required in GF (2283). In total, 9 multiplications and 22 additions are
required in GF (2283) when the Karatsuba algorithm is employed.
The ASM charts for the multiplier algorithm and the control logic are shown in Figure
A.6 in Appendix A. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 5.7. The datapath width is
283 bits wide. In order to reduce dynamic energy dissipation, wires are held at a constant
value when not in use. This is accomplished through the signals enadd10 and enadd12
(not shown), which gate the inputs and the combinational logic, respectively. Clock tree
gating is used at a higher level to reduce the energy being dissipated on the clock nets.
The LSB–first multipliers clocks are to be gated with their “done” signals. This technique
takes advantage of the early exit of the LSB–first multipliers due to their structure.
The multiplier has a NAND2 equivalent gate count of 123059 with an area of 0.295mm2.
It has a latency of 1.93µs, which is comparable to the LSB–first multiplier due to its par-
allel architecture. It also consumes 43.4nJ of energy.
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Figure 5.7: mult koa: Datapath circuit for the multiplier in GF (2283×4)
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5.5.4 Squaring
The bit-serial multiplier described in Section 5.5.2 could be used for squaring, but as
squaring is used 283 times in each loop and in the inversion circuitry, this is not the opti-
mum choice. Instead, a bit-parallel squaring circuit has been implemented. For example,
if given C(x), A(x) ∈ GF (24) then
C(x) = (A(x))2 (mod x4 + x+ 1)
= (a3x
3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0)
2 (mod x4 + x+ 1)
= a3x
3 + (a1 + a3)x
2 + a2x+ (a0 + a2) (mod x
4 + x+ 1)
(5.38)
This can be represented as a binary 4× 4 matrix.

c0
c1
c2
c3

=

1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1


a0
a1
a2
a3

(5.39)
This can be implemented with two XOR gates and a reordering of the inputs (see Figure
5.8) [61].
Figure 5.8: squarer: Squaring circuit for GF (24)
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With the aid of a C++ program this technique can be applied to elements fromGF (2283).
The resulting matrix can be converted into hardware using VHDL. As this circuit com-
prises only of coefficient re-ordering and additions it does not consume a lot of area –
3312 gates or 0.005mm2. Its latency is 0.008µs and it uses 0.004nJ of energy.
5.5.5 Square Root
In order to implement the Tate pairing the square root operation
√
α = α2
283−1
, α ∈ GF (2283) (5.40)
is required. The best approach to implementing this operation would be to calculate the
inversion of the squaring binary matrix. In the case of GF (2283) it was found that the
matrix is singular and another approach had to be considered. Two approaches were
considered; a bit serial approach and a bit parallel approach.
5.5.5.1 Serial square root circuit
From Equation (5.40) it can be seen that the square root can be calculated by 282 opera-
tions of the squaring circuitry, and this is what is implemented. The ASM charts for the
square root circuit algorithm and the control logic are shown in Figures A.5 in Appendix
A. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 5.9.
5.5.5.2 Parallel square root circuit
Using the techniques of Fong et al [32], it is possible to reduce the latency of the square
root operation to one clock cycle. Given
√
α = α2
m−1
(mod g(x)),
=
(
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i
)2m−1
(mod g(x))
(5.41)
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Figure 5.9: sqroot: Serial datapath circuit for the square root operation in GF (2283)
where
g(x) = xm + xt + xu + xv + 1, (5.42)
and
α = am−1xm−1 + am−2xm−2 + · · ·+ a1x1 + a0 (mod g(x)) (5.43)
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All of the exponents in Equation (5.42) are odd. Equation (5.41) can be further developed
as below;
√
α =
(
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i
)2m−1
=
m−1∑
i=0
ai
(
x2
m−1
)i
=
(m−1)/2∑
i=0
a2i
(
x2
m−1
)2i
+
(m−3)/2∑
i=0
a2i+1
(
x2
m−1
)2i+1
=
(m−1)/2∑
i=0
a2ix
i +
(m−3)/2∑
i=0
a2i+1x
2m−1xi
= αeven + αodd
√
x
(5.44)
From Equation (5.42) it can be seen that
1 = xm + xt + xu + xv (mod g(x))
x = xm+1 + xt+1 + xu+1 + xv+1 (mod g(x))
√
x = x(m+1)/2 + x(t+1)/2 + x(u+1)/2 + x(v+1)/2 (mod g(x))
(5.45)
Therefore
√
α = αeven + αodd(x
(m+1)/2 + x(t+1)/2 + x(u+1)/2 + x(v+1)/2) (5.46)
In the case of α ∈ GF (2283)
√
α = αeven + αodd(x
142 + x60 + x49 + x42) (5.47)
and the exponents are taken from Equation (5.19). This can be implemented in hardware
using XOR gates in one clock cycle. The combinational logic required to do the square
root operation is depicted by the ellipse with a “+” in its centre in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: sqroot par: Parallel square root circuit in GF (2283)
5.5.5.3 Conclusion
The area of the serial circuit is 4024 gates or 0.01mm2. It has a latency of 2.86µs and
consumes 2.12nJ . The parallel circuit preforms well when compared against the serial
version. It has an area of 0.008mm2, a latency of 0.008ms and uses 0.5nJ of energy. But
most importantly its area*energy*time is five orders of magnitude lower. Therefore the
parallel version will be the square root circuit that is used in this work.
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
sqroot 4024 0.01 2.863 358 0.74 2.12 0.59
sqroot par 3218 0.008 0.008 1 0.5 0.004 2.47E-06
Table 5.2: Results for square root in GF (2283)
5.5.6 Exponentiation
The only exponentiation that is required for the Tate pairing calculation is β = α2283
where α, β ∈ GF (2283×4). This is also known as the Frobenius map.
Using Equation (5.17) the exponentiation is as follows;
3∑
i=0
bix
i =
(
3∑
i=0
aix
i
)2283
=
3∑
i=0
a2
283
i x
i2283
=
3∑
i=0
aix
i2283 (mod p(x)).
(5.48)
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For a proof see [62]. The proof is based on the fact that the binomial coefficients in
the expansion of the above equation are a multiple of two, and therefore equal to zero in
GF (2). Also, a2283i ≡ ai (mod f(x)) due to Equation (5.52).
As x24 = x (mod p(x)), it can be shown;
x2
283
= x2
283 mod 4
= x2
3
=
(
x2
2
)2
= x2 + 1 (mod p(x))(
x2
283
)2
= (x2 + 1)2 = x4 + 1 = x (mod p(x))(
x2
283
)3
=
(
x2
283
)2 (
x2
283
)
= (x2 + 1)x = x3 + x (mod p(x))
(5.49)
Using Equation (5.49) it can be seen that
3∑
i=0
bix
i = (a0 + a1) + (a2 + a3)x+ a1x
2 + a3x
3 (5.50)
and can be represented using matrices as follows.

b0
b1
b2
b3

=

1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1


a0
a1
a2
a3

(5.51)
The Frobenius map can therefore be implemented in hardware with two additions in
GF (2283) and reordering of the coefficients (see Figure 5.11.
5.5.7 Inversion in GF (2283)
There are two well-known techniques for inversion of β ∈ GF (2283). One approach is
based on Fermat’s little theorem and the other uses the extended Euclidean algorithm.
5.5.7.1 Inversion by Fermat’s Little Theorem
Fermat’s little theorem (see Equation (5.52)) can be used to invert an element of GF (2283)
β2
283−1 ≡ 1 (mod f(x)). (5.52)
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Figure 5.11: frob: Exponentiation circuit in GF (2283×4)
This means that β2283−2β ≡ 1 (mod p(x)) and therefore β2283−2 is the inverse of β. The
inverse of β can be calculated with the square and multiply technique using the following
observations.
β−1 = β2
283−2 = β2
1
β2
2
β2
3 · · · β2282
= (· · · (((β)2β)2β)2 · · · β)2
(5.53)
This algorithm requires 282 squarings and 281 multiplications in GF (2283). From sec-
tion 5.5.2 and 5.5.4, it can be seen that multiplication in GF (2283) is a very expensive
operation in terms of time and energy. It would be beneficial to reduce the number of
multiplications. This can achieved using the techniques of Itoh and Tsujii [49].
As
β−1 = β2
283−2 =
(
β2
283−1−1
)2
or more generally
β−1 = β2
n−2 =
(
β2
n−1−1
)2
for a field GF (2n) then we can apply the following recursive formula to reduce the num-
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ber of multiplications. When n is odd then
β2
n−1−1 =
(
β2
n−1
2 −1
)2n−12
β2
n−1
2 −1 (5.54)
and when n is even
β2
n−1−1 =
(
β2
n−2−1
)2
β (5.55)
Equation (5.54) can be proved as follows;
(
β2
n−1
2 −1
)2n−12
β2
n−1
2 −1 = β2
n−1
2 2
n−1
2 − 2n−12 β2
n−1
2 −1
= β2
n−1
2 +
n−1
2 − 2n−12 β2
n−1
2 −1
= β2
n−1− 2n−12 β2
n−1
2 −1
= β2
n−1− 2n−12 +2n−12 −1
= β2
n−1−1
Figure 5.12: Datapath circuit for the inverter in GF (2283)using Fermat’s little theorem
The same approach can be used to prove Equation (5.55) .
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β−1 can now be decomposed using Equations (5.54) and (5.55)
β2
283−2 =
(
β2
283−1−1
)2
β2
283−1−1 =
(
β2
141−1
)(
β2
141−1
)2141
β2
142−1−1 = β
(
β2
140−1
)2
β2
141−1−1 =
(
β2
70−1
)(
β2
70−1
)270
β2
71−1−1 =
(
β2
35−1
)(
β2
35−1
)235
β2
36−1−1 = β
(
β2
34−1
)2
β2
35−1−1 =
(
β2
17−1
)(
β2
17−1
)217
β2
18−1−1 = β
(
β2
16−1
)2
β2
17−1−1 =
(
β2
8−1
)(
β2
8−1
)28
β2
9−1−1 =
(
β2
4−1
)(
β2
4−1
)24
β2
5−1−1 =
(
β2
2−1
)(
β2
2−1
)22
β2
3−1−1 = ββ2
(5.56)
Therefore by Equation (5.56) only 11 multiplications and 282 squarings are required
to obtain the inverse of β.
The ASM charts for the inverter and the control logic are shown in figures A.7 and
A.8 in Appendix A. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 5.12.
5.5.7.2 Inversion by the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
It is well known that the Euclidean algorithm can be used to find the greatest common
denominator gcd of two integers. For example the gcd (87, 53) it equal to gcd (53, 34)
i.e. the greatest common denominator of the quotient and remainder when 87 is divided
by 53. This process can be applied recursively to arrive at the gcd , which can be seen
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from Equation (5.57) to be 1.
87 = 1× 53 + 34
53 = 1× 34 + 19
34 = 1× 19 + 15
19 = 1× 15 + 4
15 = 3× 4 + 3
4 = 1× 3 + 1
3 = 3× 1
(5.57)
Working backwards from 1 = 4−1×3 and using Equation (5.58), leads to 1 = 23×53−
14× 87. This can means that 14× 87 ≡ 1 (mod 53), in other words, 14 is the inverse of
87 modulo 53.
1 = 4× (53− 3× 4)
= 4× 4− 15
= 4× (19− 15)− 15
= 4× 19− 5× 15
= 4× 19− 5× (34− 19)
= 9× 19− 5× 34
= 9× (53− 34)− 5× 34
= 9× 53− 14× 34
= 9× 53− 14× (87− 53)
= 23× 53− 14× 87
(5.58)
Using the same approach an inverse of an element of a Galois field can be obtained.
Given an irreducible polynomial f(x) = x4+x+1 ∈ F2[x] and another element A(x) =
x3 + x ∈ F2[x], then gcd (A(x), f(x)) is equal to gcd (A(x), R(x)), where R(x) is the
remainder of f(x) divided by A(x). As above, this leads to the gcd as shown by Equation
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(5.59), where the gcd is the 1 as expected.
x4 + x+ 1 = x(x3 + x) + (x2 + x+ 1)
x3 + x = x(x2 + x+ 1) + x2
x2 + x+ 1 = 1.x2 + (x+ 1)
x2 = x(x+ 1) + x
x+ 1 = 1.x+ 1
x = 1.x
(5.59)
Instead of working backwards to calculate the inverse A(x)−1 it is possible to use
the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) to represent the remainder of each stage of the
calculation in terms of A(x) and f(x), thus leading to the inverse, which in this case is
x3+x2. This is because the last line in Equation (5.60)) can be rewritten as (x3+x)(x3+
x2) ≡ 1 (mod x4 + x+ 1).
x2 + x+ 1 = (x3 + x)x+ (x4 + x+ 1)
x2 = (x3 + x)(x+ x2) + (x4 + x+ 1)x
x+ 1 = (x3 + x)(x2 + x+ 1) + (x4 + x+ 1)(x+ 1)
x = (x3 + x)(x3 + x+ 1) + (x4 + x+ 1)x2
1 = (x3 + x)(x3 + x2) + (x4 + x+ 1)(x2 + x+ 1)
(5.60)
The ASM charts for the inverter and the control logic are shown in figures A.9 and
A.10 in Appendix A. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 5.13. This block uses the
degree sub-block to measure the degree of the polynomials u and v, and this circuit is also
described in Appendix A.
5.5.7.3 Conclusion
The inverter based on Fermat’s little theorem (inv ferm) is 18412 NAND2 gates and
0.044mm2. It uses 68.1nJ of energy and require 22.65µs to run to completion. From
Table 5.5.7.3 it can be seen that the area of Euclidean inverter (euclid) is 43% more. It
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Figure 5.13: Datapath circuit for the inverter in GF (2283)using the Extended Euclidean
Algorithm
is also an order of magnitude slower and uses two magnitudes more of energy. Thus, by
all the metrics used to evaluate designs in this thesis, the inverter based on Fermat’s little
theorem is the preferred choice for inversion in GF (2283).
5.5.8 Inversion in GF (2283×4)
Fermat’s little theorem (see Equation (5.52)) can also be used to get the inversion of an
element α ∈ GF (2283×4) where the extension field of GF (2283) is obtained using the
irreducible polynomial given in Equation (5.20). The technique below, that has been used
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Algorithm 9 Extended Euclidean Algorithm for inversion in GF (2283)[39]
Require: C(x) = A(x)−1 (mod f(x))
u = A(x), v = f(x), g1 = 1, g2 = 0
while u 6= 1 do
j = 0
if v > u then
u = v, v = u, g1 = g2, g2 = g1
else
j is equal to degree of u minus degree of v
end if
u = u+ xjv
g1 = g1 + x
jg2
end while
return C(x) = g1
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
inv ferm 18412 0.044 22.65 2831 3.01 68.1 683
euclid 26300 0.063 341.436 42680 3.02 1030 2.23E+05
Table 5.3: Results for inversion in GF (2283)
by Paar and Guajardo [37], is used as it makes use of circuits that are already designed.
If the general case α ∈ GF (2mk) is considered, then the inverse is
α−1 = α2
mk−2 = α
2mk−1
2m−1 (2
m−1)−1 = α r (2
m−2)+r−1 = (αr)−1 αr−1
where r = 2mk−2
2m−1 . The technique is based on the fact that
αr ∈ GF (2m), ∀α ∈ GF (2mk) (5.61)
Algorithm 10 Inversion in GF (2mk)
Require: β = α−1
αr−1
αr = αr−1α
(αr)−1
(αr)−1αr−1
When working in the field GF (2283×4) the first stage of the inversion algorithm (10)
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is obtained by the following equations.
r − 1 = 2283 + (2283)2 + (2283)3.
If we let
β = αr−1 = α2
283+(2283)2+(2283)3
where α, β ∈ GF (2283×4) this can be rewritten as
β =
((
α2
283
α
)2283
α
)2283
Three 2283 exponentiations (see section 5.5.6) and two multiplications in GF (2283×4) (see
section 5.5.3) are required to perform this operation. The next stage is multiplication in
GF (2283×4). As α ∈GF (2283), (αr)−1 is inversion in GF (2283) as outlined earlier in this
section, and finally the last step is multiplication in GF (2283×4).
The ASM charts for the inverter and the control logic are shown in figures A.13 and
A.14 in Appendix A. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 5.14. This is a large circuit
Figure 5.14: Datapath circuit for the inverter in GF (2283×4)
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with a gate count of 174048 and an area of 0.417mm2. It has a latency of 29.8µs and its
energy usage is 5.41nJ .
5.5.9 Conclusion
All of the circuits discussed in this section are listed in Table 5.5.9 where; mult lsb* is the
LSB–first GF (2283) multiplier, mult msb is the MSB–first GF (2283) multiplier, square
is the squaring circuit, sqroot is the square root operation, mult koa is the Karatsuba al-
gorithm multiplier, inv ferm is the GF (2283) inverter and inv gf2m4 is the GF (2283×4)
multiplier. The GF (2283) multiplier is the building block upon which all the other arith-
metic operations are based, along with the squaring circuit. This approach was taken as
design re-use is key to reducing the cost of the overall system in terms of its area and
engineering man-hours.
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
mult lsb1 8992 0.022 2.31 289 1.93 4.46 2.24
mult lsb2 9671 0.023 1.897 237 2.23 4.23 1.87
mult lsb3 10217 0.025 1.776 222 2.33 4.14 1.8
mult lsb4 10925 0.026 1.717 215 2.37 4.06 1.83
mult lsb5 11713 0.028 1.708 214 2.43 4.15 2.01
mult msb 10001 0.024 2.32 290 1.7 3.94 2.22
mult koa 123059 0.295 1.926 241 22.55 43.4 247
inv ferm 18412 0.044 22.65 2831 3.01 68.1 683
euclid 26300 0.063 341.436 42680 3.02 1030 2.23E+05
inv gf2m4 174048 0.417 29.863 3733 18.12 541 67500
square 3312 0.005 0.008 1 0.53 0.004 1.60E-6
sqroot 4024 0.01 2.863 358 0.74 2.12 0.59
sqroot par 3218 0.008 0.008 1 0.5 0.004 2.47E-06
Table 5.4: Results for GF (2283) and GF (2283×4) arithmetic primitives
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5.6 Summary of Contributions
Using a TSMC 65nm low power process various arithmetic operations in the fieldsGF (2283)
and GF (2283×4) are designed, implemented and evaluated in terms of their area, energy
and latency. These are the arithmetic operations that are required for the implementation
of the Tate pairing calculation.
The LSB and MSB bit serial approach to multiplication in the field GF (2283) are
evaluated and the addition of a barrel shifter to the LSB multiplier is shown to improve its
performance. A parallel implementation of the GF (2283) multiplier was investigated and
found to perform well when evaluated against the area*energy*time metric. A module
reuse strategy is employed to reduce the area of the design and the design effort – both
important factors in the overall design’s cost. Therefore, the bit serial GF (2283) multiplier
was used for the GF (2283×4) multiplication, which uses the Karatsuba algorithm.
Inversion in GF (2283) is performed using the techniques of Itoh and Tsujii. It has
been shown that using the metric used in this thesis that it outperforms inversion circuits
based on the EEA. In the larger field, inversion is also based on Fermat’s little theorem so
as to make use of circuits that are already designed. Squaring and square root circuits are
also designed and evaluated.
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Tate Pairing Accelerator
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter the arithmetic units presented previously are incorporated into a Tate pair-
ing co-processor. Architectural variations are also presented and the work is evaluated
6.2 Tate Architecture
A top-level block diagram of the architecture of our proposed accelerator is given in Fig-
ure 6.1. The device is connected with the host using the Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB)
protocol. The Host Interface block interfaces with the APB. It is responsible for decoding
the write data input signal and address signal to write to the internal registers. The read
data output is muxed in this block with the control, status and resultant data from the Tate
pairing accelerator. These internal buses are gated when not in use to conserve energy.
The control and status register block is used to implement the control register, sta-
tus register, and the read and write data pointers (see Appendix B). Accessing the data
registers in this block has the effect of updating the write or read pointers, which are im-
plemented as six bit counters. Writes and reads to the data registers are in fact writes and
read to registers in the Tate block.
There are two clock domains in the design; the APB clock which is PCLK and runs at
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Figure 6.1: Tate Pairing Hardware Accelerator Architecture
50MHz and a system clock, tate clk, which runs at 200MHz. These clocks are assumed
to be asynchronous. Signals that cross the clock boundary will require synchronisation
and this is achieved in the synchronisation block.
Finally, the Tate block implements the algorithm for calculating the Tate pairing as
discussed below. Two points on the curve are required to calculate the Tate pairing and
these will have coordinates in GF (2283). Therefore four 283 bit values have to be written
into the device before the Tate block can be initiated. When it is finished it sends an
interrupt back to the host interface (tate intr).
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6.2.1 Algorithmic analysis
From an analysis of Algorithm 6 and the results of the arithmetic primitives presented in
Table 5.5.9, an architecture for the Tate pairing accelerator is arrived at. The ASM for this
architecture is shown in Figure 6.2. After the main body of the loop, C(x) = C(x)22×283−1
is calculated, and this can be re-written as C(x) = (C(x)2283)2283)C(x)−1. Therefore, it
is calculated using two exponentiations (shown as frob in ASM) and one inversion in
GF (2283×4).
6.2.2 Datapath
The datapath is presented in Figure 6.3. The databus is 283 × 4 bits wide. The tate in
register is arranged in 5× 283 bit registers that can be written to in 32bit or 283bit mode.
When the elliptic curve points are written into the accelerator they are accessed in 32bit
mode by the processor via the host interface block. When the operation is finished a
“done” signal is asserted which is assigned to an interrupt. Upon detection of this interrupt
the processor can read the output data, 32bits at a time, from the tate out register via reads
to the tate data out register.
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Figure 6.2: ASM for the Tate Pairing Hardware Accelerator
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The zw alu Arithmetic logic Unit (ALU) calculates z = xp + xq and w = z + xpxq +
yp + yq + 1. Internally, it has two squaring and square root circuits instantiated. It first
is used to calculate xp = x2p and yp = y2p . The tate alu ALU then calculates xpxq. Then
z and w can be arrived at. As well as the above operations, this ALU also calculates
xq = x
2283−1
q and yq = y2
283−1
q .
The tate alu ALU calculates the multiplication in GF (2283) and is also responsible for
all other arithmetic operations required by the algorithm such as; multiplication, inversion
and exponentiation – all in GF (2283×4). As was discussed above, the inversion circuit in
GF (2283×4) requires an inverter in GF (2283) and this is implemented in this ALU.
There are two sub-circuits implemented in the tate alu; one for calculating exponen-
tiation and the other for multiplication in both fields and inversion in GF (2283). This
last circuit is based upon the Karatsuba algorithm multiplier but with the modification
that one of the GF (2283) multipliers is replaced by a module that performs inversion and
multiplication in GF (2283).
6.2.3 Control Logic
The ASM for the control logic is shown in Figure 6.4. It is implemented as a Moore type
finite state machine (FSM) with nineteen states. The data is written into the Tate block by
write to the tate load bit in the control register, whilst at the same time data is written to
the tate data in register.
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Figure 6.3: Datapath for the Tate Pairing Hardware Accelerator
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Figure 6.4: ASM for the control circuit for the Tate Pairing Hardware Accelerator
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A write to the tate start bit in the control register initiates the FSM. It does 283 loops
of the main body of the algorithm and this is controlled by a counter. When the FSM is
finished the tate done signal is asserted and this is recorded in the status register and sent
to the processor as an interrupt.
6.2.4 Experimental Results
Results for the Tate pairing accelerator are shown in Table 6.2.4. From this it can be seen
that it has a latency of 0.7 ms, an area of 0.574mm2 and consumes 29600nJ .
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
tate 250992 0.574 698.11 139622 42.4 29600 1.19E+08
Table 6.1: Results for the Tate pairing accelerator
6.3 Architectural Variations
There is a lot of memory that is used in this design. Due to the limitations of the design
library (it did not include RAM cells) this memory was implemented as D-type registers.
A better approach would be to use local SRAM as this would reduce the overall area and
therefore the energy used by the accelerator.
Even though a bit-parallel multiplier was discounted at an early stage in the research
due to its large area, it has been found that it performs well when evaluated using the
area*energy*time metric against a bit-serial approach. GivenC(x), A(x), B(x) ∈ GF (24)
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then C(x) can be written as in Equation (6.1).
C(x) = A(x)B(x) (mod x4 + x+ 1)
= (a3x
3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0)(b3x
3 + b2x
2 + b1x+ b0) (mod x
4 + x+ 1)
= a3x
3 + (a1 + a3)x
2 + a2x+ (a0 + a2)
2 (mod x4 + x+ 1)
= (a0b0 + a3b1 + a2b2 + a1b3)
+ (a1b0 + (a0 + a3)b1 + (a2 + a3)b2 + (a2 + a1)b3)x
+ (a2b0 + a1b1 + (a0 + a3)b2 + (a2 + a3)b3)x
2
+ (a3b0 + a2b1 + a1b2 + (a0 + a3)b3)x
3 (mod x4 + x+ 1)
(6.1)
Alternatively, this equation can be represented in matrix form as in Equation (6.2)

c0
c1
c2
c3

=

a0 a3 a2 a1
a1 (a0 + a3) (a2 + a3) (a2 + a1)
a2 a1 (a0 + a3) (a2 + a3)
a3 a2 a1 (a0 + a3)


b0
b1
b2
b3

(6.2)
The circuit is implemented with 18 XOR and 16 AND gates. To scale this circuit up to
GF (2283) requires the calculation of a 283×283 matrix. This is easily calculated from the
observation that the first column, Z(0) is A(x) and subsequent columns, Z(i), are xiA(x)
(mod x4 + x + 1). From Table 6.3 it can be seen that although the parallel multiplier
(mult par) has an area of one magnitude larger than the serial approach (mult lsb3), its
latency and energy are considerable lower, leading to an area*energy*time figure that is
two orders of magnitude less.
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
mult lsb3 10217 0.025 1.776 222 2.33 4.14 1.8
mult par 284322 0.674 0.008 1 34.62 0.28 0.01
Table 6.2: Comparison of bit-serial and bit-parallel GF (2283) multiplier
Using the architecture for the Tate pairing accelerator outline in section 6.2, it is clear
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that this would be a large device due to the presence of nine GF (2283) multipliers, which
are themselves larger than the overall Tate pairing architecture. In order to overcome
this problem the tate alu block has to be redesigned so that it only uses one GF (2283)
multiplier.
6.3.1 Multiplication in GF (2283×4) using mult par
The technique outlined in Section 5.5.3 can be applied again to a multiplier in GF (2283×4)
that uses the parallel multiplier in GF (2283). Instead of nine parallel GF (2283) multipli-
ers, one multiplier is used in sequence to generate the intermediate values from equation
(5.37) which are then stored in the registers such as rega3b3 (see Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: Datapath circuit for the parallel multiplier in GF (2283×4)
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The ASM charts for the multiplier and the control logic are shown in Figure A.15 in
Appendix A.
From Table 6.3.1 it can be seen that although the new multiplier (mult koa par) has
an area of one magnitude larger than the original approach (mult koa), its latency and
energy are considerable lower, leading to an area*energy*time figure that is two orders of
magnitude less.
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
mult koa 123059 0.295 1.926 241 22.55 43.4 247
mult koa par 393317 0.927 0.204 26 80.81 16.5 31.2
Table 6.3: Comparison of bit-serial and bit-parallel GF (2283×4) multiplier
6.3.2 Inversion in GF (2283) using mult par
An inverter can be designed using Fermat’s little theorem and the parallel GF (2283) mul-
tiplier. This necessitates a number of changes to the design as outlined in Section 5.5.7. In
the datapath the output from the GF (2283) multiplier feeds directly to the squaring circuit,
whereas before it was registered (see Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6: Datapath circuit for the inverter in GF (2283)using Fermat’s little theorem and
based on mult par
In the ASM charts the decision box for mult done has been removed as can be seen
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in the ASM for the inverter and the control logic as shown in Figures A.17 and A.18 in
Appendix A.
A comparison of the two inverters given in Table 6.3.2, leads to the conclusion that
the original architecture for the inverter is the best choice.
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
inv ferm 18412 0.044 22.65 2831 3.01 68.1 683
inv ferm par 314334 0.755 2.39 299 113.2 270 4870
Table 6.4: Comparison of bit-serial and bit-parallel GF (2283) inverter
6.3.3 Inversion in GF (2283×4) using mult par
Using the technique outlined in Section 5.5.7 and the previous designs outlined in this
section the inverter in GF (2283×4) can be redesigned. The ASM charts are the same as in
Section 5.5.7 are shown in Figures A.13 and A.14 in Appendix A.
The block diagram is modified to contain a sub-block called mkifm alu, which pre-
forms the operations of multiplications in both fields and inversion in GF (2283). It inputs
are muxed to the top-level so that the block shown in Figure 6.7 acts as the tate alu in
Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.7: Datapath circuit for the inverter in GF (2283×4) based on mult par
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From Table 6.5 it can be seen that although the new inverter (inv gf2m4 par) has
an area of one magnitude larger than the original approach (inv gf2m4), its latency and
energy are considerable lower, leading to an area*energy*time figure that is 75% less.
Table 6.5: Comparison of bit-serial and bit-parallel GF (2283×4) inverter
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
inv gf2m4 174048 0.417 29.863 3733 18.12 541 67500
inv gf2m4 par 459522 1.085 3.98 497 97.87 389 16800
Table 6.6: Comparison of bit-serial and bit-parallel GF (2283×4) inverter
6.3.4 Experimental Results
The datapath and control logic for the block implementing the Tate pairing is the same
as before (see Figures 6.4 and 6.3). The fastest that functional clock, tate clk, can run
at in this design is 125MHz. Results for the Tate pairing accelerator based on mult par
(tate par) is shown in Table 6.3.4. From this table it can be seen that it has a latency of
0.08ms, an area of 1.139mm2 and consumes 7660nJ of energy. Even though the area
of this version of the pairing accelerator is 198% larger than the original, it still performs
better when analysed with the area*energy*time metric. This is because the latency and
energy figures are lower.
operation area area time time power energy area*energy*time
(gates) (mm2) (µs) (cycles) (mW ) (nJ) E-22mSJ
tate 250992 0.574 698.11 139622 42.4 29600 1.19E+08
tate par 509267 1.139 79.77 9971 96.03 7660 6.96E+06
Table 6.7: Results for the Tate pairing accelerator
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6.4 Evaluation
The hardware implementation compares very favourable with software. The running time
in software is 177ms and it consumes 14.1mJ . In hardware these figures are 0.70ms
and 0.0296mJ for the serial version, and a latency of 0.08ms and an energy consumption
figure of 7660nJ for the version based on mult par. Even though the area*energy*time
metric is a useful tool for evaluating designs, there must be cut–off points for its various
components. In area it has been decided that 300K NAND2 gate equivalents represents
the area cut–off point. With this figure in mind, even though tate par outperforms the tate
architecture when evaluated against the area*energy*time metric, it will not be considered
further due to its large area.
In terms of the overall system the inclusion of a hardware accelerator for the Tate
pairing will lead to a 79% reduction in latency and energy when compared with running
the protocol in software. Even with this improvement in performance, it is evident, with
the protocol still taking 91.7ms and consuming 7.3mJ , that these percentage drops are not
enough to justify the deployment of IBC in a WSN. Further significant improvements can
be attained if the power operation (gr) and the mult operation (rP ) were also accelerated.
Assuming that the same reductions in latency and energy consumption can be attained
as for the Tate pairing calculation, then the figures are as in Table 6.4. As the time for
no acceleration Tate acceleration Tate/U = rP /gr acceleration
value value % decrease value % decrease
energy 35.4mJ 7.26mJ 79.5% 0.08mJ 99.8%
time 444.5ms 91.7ms 79.4% 1.75ms 99.6%
Table 6.8: Effect of accelerating on IBC scheme
running the protocol is now 1.75ms and it consumes 0.08mJ of energy, then it is probable
that the latency and energy figures for the protocol would be in appropriate range for a
WSN. During data extraction from the network the device generating the symmetric key
only receives a signature from the KGC. Therefore the only energy cost of the radio sub-
system is the start-up energy cost of 440nJ (see Section 2.5.2).This means that running
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the protocol requires 0.52mJ . If there is a energy budget of 1000J and 1J is available for
IBC, then the protocol can be run 1923 times.
At present there is not a large body of work with which to compare this contribu-
tion. There have been several examples of the Tate pairing implemented using Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) technology, but to the best of the author’s knowledge
this is the first attempt at an ASIC implementation, and it is also the first one where energy
is considered as a key design goal.
As there are no ASIC implementations with which to compare these designs the
smaller version of the design (tate) was ported to a Xilinx FPGA XC2VP100 device.
The only change that was made to the original VHDL code was that the main bus was im-
plemented using tri-states rather than multiplexers, in order to improve the performance
of the circuit. The various contributions are detailed in Table 6.4. When compared with
this work, account must be taken of the fact that this is a design targeting an ASIC that
has been synthesised for a FPGA with minor modifications.
Shu et al [93] implement the Tate pairing using the η and ηT approach. They have
also identified that the square root operation in GF (2283) is very expensive and have
redesigned their algorithm to not compute it. Also, they use digit serial multipliers in
the field GF (2283). Six of these are required for their design. For inversion in the field
GF (2283) they use the Itoh and Tsujii approach. Of the two approaches, ηT is faster than
η when implemented in hardware, but at a considerable cost in area.
Ronan et al [55] have implemented a dedicated processor for the Tate pairing using
the ηT approach. The square roots required in the algorithm are pre-computed and stored
in a RAM. Pipelining is employed to improve the latency of the design. For multiplication
in GF (2283) a digit serial approach is employed and the Karatsuba algorithm is used for
multiplication in GF (2283×4). Inversion in GF (2283) is achieved using the modified EEA
[15] and in GF (2283×4) the technique outlined in [60] is employed. Due to the complexity
of the final exponentiation, it is implemented in a dedicated block. This architecture is
larger and slower than Shu et al’s version.
Keller et al [53] take the approach of designing an accelerator that can perform the Tate
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pairing calculation and also elliptic point scalar multiplication. They use the BKLS/GHS
algorithm, and note that it can be altered to perform point multiplication by removing
the steps in GF (2mk). It has dedicated blocks for calculating the line function and point
addition and doubling on the elliptic curve. In GF (2283) multiplication is performed
using a digit serial approach and the divisions are achieved using the techniques detailed
by Shantz [91]. The Karatsuba algorithm is used for multiplication in GF (2283×4). They
achieve a latency of 2810 µs, whilst maintaining a relatively small area.
Keller et al [52] develop their work further by the inclusion of a dedicated GF (2283×4)
inverter block. This inverter block is based on the algorithm presented in [60], and it
requires thirty-six GF (2283) multiplications and one inversion in GF (2283). By including
this block they find that they improve the latency to 1670 µs but increase the area by 34%.
Ronan et al [81] use a genus two hyper-elliptic curve defined over GF (2106) to im-
plement the Tate pairing. As this curve has a security multiplier of twelve, its level of
security is comparable with the elliptic case defined over GF (2283). The architecture is
divided into four blocks. A per-computation block calculates and stores squares of the in-
out points. An ALU performs all the operations required in GF (2106) and GF (2106×12).
There is also a controller block and a memory block. Multiplication in the smaller field is
performed using a digit serial approach, and in the large field using Karatsuba algorithm.
Inversion in GF (2106) and GF (2106×12) is achieved using the modified EEA of [15] and
[60] respectively. This architecture has an area of 43986 slices and 749 µs
There are a couple of implementations in characteristic three. Kerins et al [54] use the
Duursma–Lee to calculate the Tate pairing on E(397). Their architecture has an area of
50286 slices and a latency of 5920 µs. Grabher and Page [35] also implement the Tate
pairing in characteristic three. Instead of having a hard-wired solution they use a general
purpose processor to control the an ALU co-processor. This enables the calculation of
the pairing and also that of the elliptic curve point multiplication required by IBC. It is
unclear how the stated timings in the paper are arrived at. Given that the ALU has an area
of 1700 slices and the multiplier in GF (397) is 946 slices, it is clear that this device can
only contain one multiplier, which requires 28 clock cycles to perform the multiplication
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and two cycles to fetch and store the result. If the top frequency of 150MHz is considered,
then one multiplication takes 210ns. And as there are, at least, 20 multiplications in a loop
and 97 loops, then, discounting other operations, the Tate pairing will take 407µs. This
figure is larger than 399µs quoted in their paper.
From an analysis of the above designs, it is apparent that a digit serial approach to
multiplication inGF (2283) should be investigated. If a digit serial approach was employed
it would offer no benefit in terms of performance if the square root operation’s latency was
not reduced. Therefore the square root could be precomputed and stored in RAM as in
[55]. It is estimated that if this technique was used in tate par that the latency would
decrease to 75µs. Some of the implementations use the technique outlined in [60] for
inversion in GF (2283×4). This requires the same number of multiplications in GF (2283)
as the approach used in this thesis, and so it offers no advantage.
As can be seen from Table 6.4, this implementation is quite slow when compared
with the work of Shu et al [93]. It is thirty six times slower but only 20% smaller. It is
believed that the slice count could be greatly reduced by the use of block RAM in lieu
of the registers in this design. Also, tri–states could be more widely used to increase the
speed of the circuit.
design curve algorithm Xilinx device CLB Slices frequency Time
(MHz) (µs)
tate E(2283) η XC2VP100 29929 59 2360
[93] E(2283) η XC2VP100 22726 84 87
[93] E(2283) ηT XC2VP100 33252 56 78
[55] E(2313) ηT XC2VP100 41078 50 124
[53] E(2283) BKLS/GHS XC2V6000 24655 47 2810
[52] E(2283) BKLS/GHS XC2V6000 33047 33 1670
[81] E(2103) η XC2VP125 43986 32 749
[54] E(397) Duursma–Lee XC2VP125 50286 19 5920
[35] E(397) Duursma–Lee XC2VP4 4481 150 399
Table 6.9: Comparison with prior art
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6.5 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter a low cost Tate pairing accelerator is designed and implemented in a TSMC
65nm low power process. Using the η algorithm, an architecture for implementing the
Tate pairing calculation is arrived at. An analysis of the algorithm led to the decision
that two ALUs should be incorporated in the datapath. There are two variations of this
architecture designed; one is based on a bit serial multiplier and the other is based on a
parallel multiplier. For reasons of area, it is considered that the serial version is the most
appropriate choice for inclusion in a wireless sensor node.
The Tate pairing in hardware takes 0.7ms to complete and consumes 29.6µJ of en-
ergy, as compared to 177ms and 1.41E-2J when run on an ARM machine. This leads to
a significant reduction in the cost of running IBC on a constrained device. It has been
discussed how with the acceleration of the other computationally demanding components
of this algorithm that it would be possible to use IBC in the context of a WSN.
Due to a lack of ASIC designs with which to compare this design, it was ported to a
Xilinx FPGA XC2VP100 device to enable comparisons with existing solutions. Unfor-
tunately, the prior art outperforms this design in terms of area and latency, but this is a
rather unfair comparison, as account must be taken of the fact that this implementation of
the η pairing targets an ASIC.
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Conclusions & Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
7.1.1 Motivation for Proposed Research – A Summary
Developments in CMOS radio, electronics and MEMS technologies are enabling the con-
vergence of three key technologies onto the one platform. These are sensing, computation
and RF communication. The emergence of these devices will enable sensing technologies
to become embedded in our environment, to interact with us in new and meaningful ways.
Some of areas in which they devices could be deployed are smart roads, healthcare and
environmental monitoring.
Different application areas will give rise to different challenges, but there is a common
set of design constraints that a WSN device must address. One of the main drivers for
adoption of this technology will be cost. At present, large sensors, such as the AreaRAE
IAQ from RAE [78], are very expensive. If they could be replaced by cheap sensors, that
even though they might not be as sensitive, are able to achieve the same level of result,
then this would encourage deployment of WSNs. It will be required, again for reasons of
cost, that these networks have a long lifetime on a very limited energy supply. A figure of
the order of 1000J is the energy resource of these devices, and therefore it is imperative
to reduce energy dissipation from the network level down to the algorithms that run on
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the devices. There is no point having a low cost network if it is costly to deploy and
maintain, so it must be self-configuring and robust to individual wireless sensor node
failure. In most deployments of these devices, security of the data in the network will be
a requirement.
A symmetric key cryptosystem is appropriate for communication between the nodes,
though a pre-installed system wide symmetric key or pair-wise keys stored on the devices
are not suitable for reasons of security and lack of memory, respectively. Therefore an
asymmetric or public key system is required to establish the symmetric keys between
individual nodes. This thesis is concerned with finding a solution to the key distribution
problem in a WSN.
7.1.2 Summary of Thesis Contributions
The concept of a low cost wireless sensor network is discussed in chapter 1. Of the
example application areas discussed in this chapter; environmental monitoring, in the
context of a counter-terrorism role, is highlighted as the target application. This is because
of the high level of security required.
Chapter 2 outlines the technical challenges facing the emerging technology of WSNs.
Along with cost, energy dissipation and ease of use; security is highlighted as a key
challenge to make the vision of ubiquitous sensing a reality.
Chapter 3 is an overview of the mathematics required for understanding of the research
in the later chapters. The Tate pairing is introduced and various algorithms for calculating
the pairing are discussed. It has been concluded that the the η algorithm [59, 6] would be
the most amenable to a low energy hardware implementation. This is because it has the
least number of multiplications in GF (2283) and has a regular structure that maps well to
hardware.
In chapter 4 the security requirements of a WSN are discussed. It is concluded that
a symmetric scheme is the appropriate choice for securing data in the network, and that
a system based on IBC should be implemented to distribute the symmetric keys. The
BMLQ IBS and SOK identity-based NIKDS schemes are used to develop a protocol that
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authenticates network access, distributes local symmetric keys and provides a mechanism
for the WSN to communicate securely with a sink. It is evaluated against well known
attacks on a WSN and found to perform well. The component parts of the protocol are
profiled in terms of latency and energy consumption. It was decided that the most compu-
tationally intensive part of the scheme, which is the Tate pairing, would be implemented
in hardware.
Chapters 5 and 6 describes the design of a low cost Tate pairing accelerator to be im-
plemented in a TSMC 65nm low power process. The η algorithm is chosen to implement
the Tate pairing. This algorithm is analysed for the various arithmetic operations in the
fields GF (2283) and GF (2283×4) that are required, and these operations are designed and
then evaluated in terms of their area, energy and latency. A top level architecture is de-
signed which incorporates these arithmetic units in two ALUs. Two variations of the Tate
pairing accelerator are designed; one based on a bit-serial LSB GF (2283) multiplier and
another based on a parallel GF (2283) multiplier.
Timing and energy figures for the accelerators are generated and compared with soft-
ware. From the area of the two approaches it is clear that the accelerator based on the
bit-serial multiplier is the best choice for a WSN. An estimation is made for the total en-
ergy and time required for implementing the protocol when the exponentiation and point
multiplication functions are also accelerated on hardware. These figures prove that a sys-
tem based on IBC could be considered for distributing symmetric keys in a WSN. The
design is ported to an FPGA and compared against existing solutions.
7.1.3 Research Objectives Achieved
The objectives of this research objectives as set out in Section 1.4 have been achieved as
follows.
1. Well known techniques for implementing security in a WSN were evaluated. The
key considerations were; the security offered by the protocol, ability to scale and
amounts of bits required to be transmitted by the radio, which affects the energy
consumed in the network. The conclusion was reached that a symmetric scheme,
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such as AES is warranted, but that a scheme based on IBC should be used to dis-
tribute the symmetric keys.
2. A protocol that uses BMLQ IBS and SOK identity-based NIKDS has been proposed
to distribute symmetric keys in a WSN. It uses the fact that the wireless sensor nodes
will know their relative position to provide protection against well known attacks.
The protocol was profiled on an ARM platform [5] in order to measure the energy
consumption of its component parts, timing figures were also obtained. The Tate
pairing was identified as consuming the most energy.
3. The Tate pairing has been designed using a TSMC 65nm low power process. The
Miracl library was used to verify the functionality of the Tate pairing accelerator.
4. The approach has been validated in that the hardware implementation greatly re-
duced the amount of energy and time required to run the Tate pairing when com-
pared with software. There are no ASIC implementations with which to compare
this work, but it has been compared with FPGA solutions.
7.2 Future Work
The next natural stage of this work would be the implementation of elliptic curve multi-
plication and exponentiation in the field GF (2283×4) in order to prove the figures given
in Table 6.4. This could be achieved using the hardwired approach outlined in this thesis
i.e. there could be a series of FSMs present for implementing the different algorithms. A
better approach would be to make the device programmable. As well as enabling the two
operations mentioned above to be performed, a programmable device would also allow
the different algorithms that calculate the Tate pairing, such as the ηT method, to be run.
The block implementing the Tate pairing calculation could be altered so that instead
of a FSM generating the control logic, there would be a FSM generating an address. This
five bit address would be used to control a multiplexer which select the relevant control
logic. The control logic required is 32 bits wide and is stored in a register bank. In total
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there would be 32 of these 32 bit registers. They are written via the APB interface. The
only operation that is required to be added to the datapath is the squaring operation in
GF (2283×4).
Consideration should also be given to implementing the improvements that were dis-
cussed in Section 6.4, such as investigating the benefits of a digit serial approach to mul-
tiplication in GF (2283) and precomputation of the required square roots.
Now that it has been determined that a IBC scheme could be implemented on a wire-
less sensor node, if it is accelerated in hardware, then the protocol as outlined in section
4.7 can also be used in WSN. This protocol now has to be validated, firstly in a software
simulation environment, and then in a real depolyment. Some of the characteristics of a
WSN that need to be modeled are; the energy dissipation of the devices by the radio and
digital computation, the routing algorithm that are used to establish the network and the
protocol given in this thesis. This model could be used to evaluate the protocol against
the attacks listed in Section 4.8.
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APPENDIX A
Algorithmic State Machines for the designs
A.1 Introduction
In this appendix the ASM diagrams for the various circuits in Chapters 5 and 6 are pre-
sented.
A.2 Algorithmic State Machine Diagrams
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Algorithmic State Machines for the designs
Figure A.1: ASM chart for the lsb multiplier in GF (2283)
139
Algorithmic State Machines for the designs
Figure A.2: ASM for the control circuit for the lsb multiplier in GF (2283)
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Figure A.3: ASM chart for the msb multiplier in GF (2283)
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Figure A.4: ASM for the control circuit for the msb multiplier in GF (2283)
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Figure A.5: ASM charts for the serial square root operation in GF (2283)
Figure A.6: ASM charts for the multiplier in GF (2283×4)
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Figure A.7: ASM chart for the inverter in GF (2283) using Fermat’s little theorem
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Figure A.8: ASM for the control circuit for the inverter in GF (2283) using Fermat’s little
theorem
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Figure A.9: ASM chart for the inverter in GF (2283) using the Extended Euclidean Algo-
rithm
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Figure A.10: ASM for the control circuit for the inverter in GF (2283) using the Extended
Euclidean Algorithm
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Figure A.11: ASM for getting the degree of a polynomial
Figure A.12: ASM for the control circuit for getting the degree of a polynomial
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Figure A.13: ASM chart for the inverter in GF (2283×4)
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Figure A.14: ASM for the control circuit for the inverter in GF (2283×4)
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Figure A.15: ASM charts for the parallel multiplier in GF (2283×4)
Figure A.16: Datapath circuit for getting the degree of a polynomial
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Algorithmic State Machines for the designs
Figure A.17: ASM chart for the inverter in GF (2283) using Fermat’s little theorem and
based on mult par
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Figure A.18: ASM for the control circuit for the inverter in GF (2283) using Fermat’s little
theorem and based on mult par
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Programmer’s Model
B.1 Introduction
What follows is a description of the registers to aid programming of the module. The
registers addresses are offset from the base address Tatebase.
B.2 Summary of Registers
Address Type Width Reset Value Name Description
Tatebase + 0x00 Wr 32 0x00000000 tate data in Data in register
Tatebase + 0x04 Rd 32 0x00000000 tate data out Data out register
Tatebase + 0x08 Wr/Rd 32 0x00000000 tate control Control register
Tatebase + 0x0C Rd 32 0x00000000 tate status Status register
Table B.1: Register Summary
B.3 Register Descriptions
tate data in [32] +0x00
tate data in is the data write register. Data written to this register address is transferred
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into the internal registers in the Tate pairing algorithm accelerator block.
Bit Name Type Function
31:0 data Wr Write data
Table B.2: tate data in
tate data out [32] +0x04
tate data out is the data read register. Reading from this register is in effect reading the
internal output register in the Tate pairing algorithm accelerator block.
Bit Name Type Function
31:0 data Rd Read data
Table B.3: tate data out
tate control [32] +0x08
tate control is the control register. Bit’s zero and one control reset the read and write
pointer which are used to fill the internal register of the Tate block. Bit two (tate load)
enables the loading of the data into the Tate block and bit three (tate start) initiates the
calculation of the algorithm.
Bit Name Type Function
0 counter clr rd Wr/Rd reset data read pointer
1 counter clr wr Wr/Rd reset data write pointer
2 tate load Wr/Rd load data into accelerator
3 tate start Wr/Rd start Tate pairing calculation
31:4 Wr/Rd not used
Table B.4: tate control
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tate status [32] +0x0C
tate status is the status registers and it records the tate done signal so that it may be read
by software. A write, of any data, to this register clears the tate done bit.
Bit Name Type Function
1 tate done Rd Tate algorithm has completed
31:0 Wr A write to the status register clears the tate done bit
31:1 Rd not used
Table B.5: tate status
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Signal Descriptions
C.1 Introduction
The signals that interface with the module are described below. There are two set of
signals; the AMBA APB signals and the additional on-chip signals.
C.2 APB Signal
The module is a slave of the AMBA APB. Below are the signals required to connect the
device to this bus. All signals are active high.
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Name Type Source Description
PCLK Input APB 50MHz clock to time bus transfers.
PENABLE Input APB The APB enable signal is asserted high
for one clock cycle to enable a bus transfer.
PSEL Input APB When asserted indicates that the module has
been selected by the APB bridge and data
transfer is requested.
PWRITE Input APB When asserted high this indicates a bus write, when
asserted low a bus read is required.
PADDR[7:2] Input APB APB address bus
PWDATA[31:0] Input APB APB write data bus
PRDATA[31:0] Input APB APB read data bus
Table C.1: APB Signal Descriptions
C.3 On-Chip Signals
These are the non APB signals that the module requires or generates.
Name Type Source Destination Description
tate clk Input Clock Generator Tate block, 125MHz system clock
Synchroniser block
reset n Input Reset Controller All blocks Global reset
tate intr Output Tate Block Interupt Controller An active high interrupt to indicate
that the algorithm is finished
Table C.2: On-Chip Signal Descriptions
158
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] L. M. Adleman, “The function field sieve,” in Algorithmic Number Theory, ser.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 877. Springer, 1994, pp. 108–121.
[2] R. Adler, M. Flanigan, J. Huang, R. Kling, N. Kushalnagar, L. Nachman, C.-Y.
Wan, and M. Yarvis, “Intel mote 2: an advanced platform for demanding sensor
network applications,” in SenSys ’05: Proceedings of the 3rd international confer-
ence on Embedded networked sensor systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM Press,
2005, pp. 298–298.
[3] “Sensory Silicon,” Akustica. [Online]. Available: http://www.akustica.com
[4] I. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “Wireless sensors
networks: a survey,” Computer Networks, vol. 38, pp. 393–422, Mar. 2002.
[5] “ARM922T,” ARM. [Online]. Available: http://www.arm.com
[6] P. S. L. M. Barreto, S. Galbraith, C. O. hEigeartaigh, and M. Scott, “Efficient pair-
ing computation on supersingular abelian varieties,” Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2004/375, 2004, http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[7] P. S. L. M. Barreto, B. Libert, N. McCullagh, and J.-J. Quisquater, “Efficient and
provably-secure identity-based signatures and signcryption from bilinear maps,” in
Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 3788. Springer, 2005, pp. 515–532.
159
[8] P. S. L. M. Barreto, B. Lynn, and M. Scott, “Efficient implementation of pairing-
based cryptosystems,” J. Cryptol., vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 321–334, 2004.
[9] Berkeley. (2006) PicoRadio project. [Online]. Available: http://bwrc.eecs.berkeley.
edu/Research/Pico Radio
[10] M. Bhardwaj, R. Min, and A. Chandrakasan, “Power-aware systems,” in Proc. of
34th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, Nov. 2000.
[11] I. Blake, G. Seroussi, N. Smart, and J. W. S. Cassels, Advances in Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series). New York,
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[12] I. F. Blake, G. Seroussi, and N. P. Smart, Elliptic curves in cryptography. New
York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[13] D. Boneh and M. Franklin, “Identity-based encryption from the Weil pairing,”
SIAM J. of Computing, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 586–614, 2003.
[14] S. D. Brown and Z. G. Vranesic, Fundamentals of Digital Logic with VHDL De-
sign. McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2000.
[15] H. Brunner, A. Curiger, and M. Hofstetter, “On computing multiplicative inverses
in GF(2m),” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 42, no. 8, pp. 1010–1015, Aug.
1993.
[16] K. M. Butler, “Estimating the economic benefits of DFT,” IEEE Des. Test, vol. 16,
no. 1, pp. 71–79, 1999.
[17] J. C. Cha and J. H. Cheon, “An identity-based signature from gap diffie-hellman
groups.” in Public Key Cryptography, 2003, pp. 18–30.
[18] H. Chan and A. Perrig, “Security and privacy in sensors networks,” IEEE Com-
puter, vol. 36, no. 10, pp. 103–105, Oct. 2003.
160
[19] A. Chandrakasan, R. Min, M. Bhardwaj, S.-H. Cho, and A. Wang, “Power aware
wireless microsensor systems,” in Proc. ESSCIRC, Florence,Italy, Sep. 2002, pp.
34–44.
[20] W. Chen, L. Chen, Z. Chen, and S. Tu, “Wits: A wireless sensor network for
intelligent transportation system,” imsccs, vol. 2, pp. 635–641, 2006.
[21] S. Y. Cheung, S. Coleri, B. Dundar, S. Ganesh, C.-W. Tan, and P. Varaiya, “Traffic
measurement and vehicle classification with a single magnetic sensor,” Journal of
Transportation Research Board, 2005.
[22] C.-Y. Chong and S. P. Kumar, “Sensor networks: Evolution, opportunities, and
challenges,” in Proc. IEEE special issue on Sensor Networks and Applications,
vol. 91, no. 8, Aug. 2003, pp. 1247–1256.
[23] D. Coppersmith, “Fast evaluation of logarithms in fields of characteristic two,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 587–594, Jul. 1984.
[24] MICA2 Wireless Measurement System, Crossbow Technology. [Online]. Available:
http://www.xbow.com
[25] D. Culler, D. Estrin, and M. Srivastava, “Guest editors’ introduction: Overview of
sensor networks,” Computer, vol. 37, no. 8, pp. 41–49, Aug. 2004.
[26] J. R. Douceur, “The sybil attack.” in IPTPS, 2002, pp. 251–260.
[27] I. M. Duursma and H.-S. Lee, “Tate pairing implementation for hyperelliptic curves
y2 = xp-x + d.” in ASIACRYPT, 2003, pp. 111–123.
[28] T. ElGamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 469–472, Jul. 1985.
[29] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme for distributed sen-
sor networks,” in Proc. 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Washington,DC,USA, Nov. 2002, pp. 41–47.
161
[30] D. F. Finchelstein, B. H. Calhoun, D. C. Daly, N. Verma, D. D. Wentzloff, A. Wang,
S.-H. Cho, and A. P. Chandrakasan, “Design considerations for ultra-low energy
wireless microsensor nodes,” IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 727–740,
2005.
[31] D. F. Finchelstein, S. M.-B. H. Calhoun, S. M.-D. C. Daly, S. M.-N. Verma, S. M.-
D. D. Wentzloff, M.-A. Wang, M.-S.-H. Cho, and F.-A. P. Chandrakasan, “De-
sign considerations for ultra-low energy wireless microsensor nodes,” IEEE Trans.
Comput., vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 727–740, 2005.
[32] K. Fong, D. Hankerson, J. Lopez, and A. Menezes, “Field inversion and point
halving revisited,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 1047–
1059, Aug. 2004.
[33] S. D. Galbraith, K. Harrison, and D. Soldera, “Implementing the Tate pairing,” in
ANTS-V: Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Number
Theory. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2002, pp. 324–337.
[34] T. Gao, D. Greenspan, M. Welsh, R. R. Juang, and A. Alm, “Vital signs monitoring
and patient tracking over a wireless network,” in Engineering in Medicine and
Biology Society, 2005. IEEE-EMBS 2005. 27th Annual International Conference
of the, Sep. 2005, pp. 102–105.
[35] P. Grabher and D. Page, “Hardware acceleration of the tate pairing in characteris-
tic three.” in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2005, ser.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3659. Springer, pp. 398–411.
[36] R. Granger, D. Page, and M. Stam, “Hardware and software normal basis arith-
metic for pairing-based cryptography in characteristic three,” IEEE Transactions
on Computers, vol. 54, no. 7, pp. 852–860, Jul. 2005.
[37] J. Guajardo and C. Paar, “Itoh-Tsujii inversion in standard basis and its application
in cryptography and codes,” Des. Codes Cryptography, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 207–216,
2002.
162
[38] V. Gutnik and A. P. Chandrakasan, “Embedded power supply for low-power DSP,”
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 5, no. 4,
pp. 425–435, Dec. 1997.
[39] D. Hankerson, A. J. Menezes, and S. Vanstone, Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy. Secaucus, NJ, USA: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2003.
[40] N. Hashmi, D. Myung, M. Gaynor, and S. Moulton, “A sensor-based, web service-
enabled, emergency medical response system,” in EESR ’05: Proceedings of the
2005 workshop on End-to-end, sense-and-respond systems, applications and ser-
vices. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2005, pp. 25–29.
[41] W. Heinzelman, A. Sinha, A. Wang, and A. Chandrakasan, “Energy-scalable al-
gorithms and protocols for wireless microsensor networks,” in Proc. International
Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP), Jun. 2000.
[42] A. Hierlemann, “Integrated chemical microsensor systems in CMOS-technology,”
in Solid-State Sensors, Actuators and Microsystems, 2005. Digest of Technical
Papers. TRANSDUCERS ’05. The 13th International Conference on, vol. 2, Jun.
2005, pp. 1134–1137.
[43] J. L. Hill and D. E. Culler, “Mica: a wireless platform for deeply embedded net-
works,” IEEE Micro, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 12–24, Nov./Dec. 2002.
[44] J. Hill, M. Horton, R. Kling, and L. Krishnamurthy, “The platforms enabling wire-
less sensor networks,” Commun. ACM, vol. 47, no. 6, pp. 41–46, 2004.
[45] J. L. Hill, “System architecture for wireless sensor networks,” Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2003. [Online]. Available:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/∼jhill
[46] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Wormhole attacks in wireless networks,”
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 370–380,
Feb. 2006.
163
[47] C. Intanagonwiwat, R. Govindan, and D. Estrin, “Directed diffusion: a scalable
and robust communication paradigm for sensor networks,” in MobiCom ’00: Pro-
ceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and net-
working. New York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2000, pp. 56–67.
[48] “Intel Research,” Intel. [Online]. Available: http://www.intel.com/research/
exploratory/motes.htm
[49] T. Itoh and S. Tsujii, “A fast algorithm for computing multiplicative inverses in
GF (2m) using normal bases,” Inf. Comput., vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 171–177, 1988.
[50] A. Karatsuba and Y. Ofman, “Multiplication of many-digital numbers by automatic
computers,” Translation in Physics-Doklady, vol. 7, pp. 595–596, 1963.
[51] C. Karlof, N. Sastry, and D. Wagner, “TinySec: a link layer security architecture
for wireless sensor networks,” in SenSys ’04: Proceedings of the 2nd international
conference on Embedded networked sensor systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM
Press, 2004, pp. 162–175.
[52] M. Keller, R. Ronan, W. Marnane, and C. Murphy, “A GF(24m) inverter and its ap-
plication in a reconfigurable tate pairing processor,” in Reconfigurable Computing
and FPGA’s, 2006. ReConFig 2006. IEEE International Conference on, San Luis
Potosi, Mexico, Sep. 2006, pp. 1–10.
[53] M. Keller, T. Kerins, F. Crowe, and W. Marnane, “Fpga implementation of a
gf(2m) tate pairing architecture,” in International Workshop on Applied Recon-
figurable Computing - ARC, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3985.
Springer, pp. 358–369.
[54] T. Kerins, W. P. Marnane, E. M. Popovici, and P. S. L. M. Barreto, “Hardware ac-
celerators for pairing based cryptosystems,” IEE Proceedings Information Security,
vol. 152, pp. 47–56, Oct. 2005.
[55] T. Kerins, C. Murphy, C. O hEigeartaigh, R. Ronan, and M. Scott, “FPGA accel-
eration of the tate pairing in characteristic 2,” in Field Programmable Technology,
164
2006. FPT 2006. IEEE International Conference on, Bangkok, Dec. 2006, pp. 213–
220.
[56] N. S. Kim, T. Austin, D. Baauw, T. Mudge, K. Flautner, J. S. Hu, M. J. Irwin,
M. Kandemir, and V. Narayanan, “Leakage current: Moore’s law meets static
power,” Computer, vol. 36, no. 12, pp. 68–75, Dec. 2003.
[57] A. Kinane, “Energy Efficient Hardware Acceleration of Multimedia Processing
Tools,” Ph.D. dissertation, School of Electronic Engineering, Dublin City
University, Apr. 2006. [Online]. Available: http://www.eeng.dcu.ie/∼kinanea/
thesis/kinane final.pdf
[58] L. M. Kohnfelder, “Toward a practical public-key ctyptosystem,” MIT, Cambridge,
Mass., USA, May 1978, bachelor’s thesis.
[59] S. Kwon, “Efficient Tate pairing computation for elliptic curves over binary fields.”
in ACISP, 2005, pp. 134–145.
[60] C. H. Lim and H. S. Hwang, “Fast implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic in
GF(pn).” in Public Key Cryptography, Third International Workshop on Practice
and Theory in Public Key Cryptography - PKC, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 1751. Springer, 2000, pp. 405–421.
[61] E. D. Mastrovito, “VLSI architectures for computation in Galois fields,” Ph.D.
dissertation, Linko¨ping University, Linko¨ping, Sweden, 1989.
[62] R. J. McEliece, Finite fields for computer scientists and engineers. Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1987.
[63] A. J. Menezes, Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems. London, UK: Kulwer
Academic Publishers, 1993.
[64] V. S. Miller, “Short programs for functions on curves,” 1986, unpublished.
[Online]. Available: http://crypto.stanford.edu/miller/miller.pdf
165
[65] R. Min and A. Chandrakasan, “A framework for energy-scalable communication
in high-density wireless networks,” in ISLPED ’02: Proceedings of the 2002 inter-
national symposium on Low power electronics and design. New York, NY, USA:
ACM Press, 2002, pp. 36–41.
[66] R. Min, S.-H. Cho, M. Bhardwaj, E. Shih, A. Wang, and A. Chandrakasan, Power-
Aware Design Methodologies. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, ch. Power-
Aware Wireless Microsensor Networks, pp. 335–372.
[67] M.I.T. (2006) µ-adaptive multi-domain power aware sensors. [Online]. Available:
http://mtlweb.mit.edu/researchgroups/icsystems/uamps/
[68] G. E. Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,” Electronics,
vol. 38, no. 8, Apr. 19 1965.
[69] T. Mudge, “Power: a first-class architectural design constraint,” Computer, vol. 34,
no. 4, pp. 52–58, Apr. 2001.
[70] J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, and A. Perrig, “The sybil attack in sensor networks:
analysis & defenses,” in IPSN ’04: Proceedings of the third international sympo-
sium on Information processing in sensor networks. New York, NY, USA: ACM
Press, 2004, pp. 259–268.
[71] NIST, “Digital signature standard,” National Institute of Standard and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD, USA, Tech. Rep. FIPS 186-2, Jan. 2000.
[72] C. Paar, P. Fleischmann, and P. Roelse, “Efficient multiplier architectures for Galois
fields GF (24n),” IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 162–170, 1998.
[73] M. Perkins, N. Correal, and B. O’Dea, “Emergent wireless sensor network limi-
tations: A plea for advancement in core technologies,” Motorola Labs, Plantation,
Florida, USA, Tech. Rep., 2002.
[74] A. Perrig, J. Stankovic, and D. Wagner, “Security in wireless sensors networks,”
Communications of the ACM, vol. 47, no. 6, pp. 53–57, Jun. 2004.
166
[75] J. M. Pollard, “Monte carlo methods for index computation (mod p),” Math. Com-
put., vol. 32, no. 143, pp. 918–924, 1978.
[76] J. M. Rabaey, M. Ammer, J. L. da Silva Jr., D. Patel, and S. Roundy, “PicoRadio
supports ad hoc ultra-low power wireless networking,” Computer Magazine, pp.
42–48, Jul. 2000.
[77] J. M. Rabaey, A. Chandrakasan, and B. Nikolic, Digital Integrated Circuits: A
Design Perspective, 2nd ed. Prentice Hall, 2003.
[78] “AreaRAE IAQ,” RAE Systems. [Online]. Available: http://www.raesystems.com
[79] V. Raghunathan, C. Schurgers, S. Park, and M. B. Srivastava, “Energy-aware wire-
less microsensor networks,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 19, no. 2, pp.
40–50, Mar. 2002.
[80] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman, “A method of obaining digital signa-
tures and public key cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2,
pp. 120–126, Feb. 1978.
[81] R. Ronan, C. O. hEigeartaigh, C. Murphy, M. Scott, T. Kerins, and W. P. Marnane,
“An embedded processor for a pairing-based cryptosystem,” in Information Tech-
nology: New Generations, 2006. ITNG 2006. Third International Conference on,
Apr. 2006, pp. 192–197.
[82] S. Roundy, B. Otis, Y. Chee, J. Rabaey, and P. Wright, “A 1.9ghz RF transmit
beacon using environmentally scavenged energy,” in ISLPED, Seoul, Korea, Aug.
2003.
[83] S. Roundy, D. Steingart, L. Frechette, P. K. Wright, and J. M. Rabaey, “Power
sources for wireless sensor networks.” in EWSN, 2004, pp. 1–17.
[84] A. Sadat, H. Qu, C. Yu, J. S. Yuan, and H. Xie, “Low-power CMOS wireless
MEMS motion sensor for physiological activity monitoring,” Circuits and Systems
167
I: Regular Papers, IEEE Transactions on [see also Circuits and Systems I: Fun-
damental Theory and Applications, IEEE Transactions on], vol. 52, no. 12, pp.
2539–2551, Dec. 2005.
[85] R. Sakai, K. Ohgishi, and M. Kasahara, “Cryptosystems based on pairing,” in Sym-
posium on Cryptography and Information Security (SCIS2000), Okinawa, Japan,
Jan. 2000, pp. 26–28.
[86] C. Savarese, “Robust positioning algorithms for distributed ad-hoc wireless sensor
networks,” Master’s thesis, University of California, Berkeley, California, U.S.A.,
2002.
[87] C. Savarese, J. M. Rabaey, and J. Beutel, “Locationing in distributed ad-hoc wire-
less sensor networks,” in Proc. International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and
Signal Processing (ICASSP), May 2001.
[88] R. C. Shah and J. Rabaey, “Energy aware routing for low energy ad hoc sensor
networks,” in Proc. IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference
(WCNC), Mar. 2002.
[89] A. Shamir, “Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes,” in Proc. Crypto
’84, Santa Barbara, California, USA, Aug. 1984, pp. 47–54.
[90] “Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C/C++ Library (MIRACL),”
Shamus Software. [Online]. Available: http://www.shamus.ie
[91] S. C. Shantz, “From euclid’s gcd to montgomery multiplication to the great divide,”
Mountain View, CA, USA, Tech. Rep., 2001.
[92] E. Shih, S.-H. Cho, N. Ickes, R. Min, A. Sinha, A. Wang, and A. Chandrakasan,
“Physical layer driven algorithm and protocol design for energy-efficient wireless
sensor networks,” in MobiCom ’01: Proceedings of the 7th annual international
conference on Mobile computing and networking. New York, NY, USA: ACM
Press, 2001, pp. 272–286.
168
[93] C. Shu, K. Gaj, and S. Kwon, “FPGA accelerated tate pairing based cryptosystems
over binary fields,” in Field Programmable Technology, 2006. FPT 2006. IEEE
International Conference on, Bangkok, Dec. 2006, pp. 173–180.
[94] A. Sinha and A. Chandrakasan, “Energy aware software,” in Proc. of the 13th In-
ternational Conference on VLSI Design, Jan. 2000, pp. 50–55.
[95] ——, “Operating system and algorithmic techniques for energy scalable wireless
sensor networks,” in MDM ’01: Proceedings of the Second International Confer-
ence on Mobile Data Management. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2001, pp.
199–209.
[96] A. Sinha, A. Wang, and A. P. Chandrakasan, “Algorithmic transforms for efficient
energy scalable computation,” in ISLPED ’00: Proceedings of the 2000 interna-
tional symposium on Low power electronics and design. New York, NY, USA:
ACM Press, 2000, pp. 31–36.
[97] G. Stitt, F. Vahid, and S. Nematbakhsh, “Energy savings and speedups from parti-
tioning critical software loops to hardware in embedded systems,” Trans. on Em-
bedded Computing Sys., vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 218–232, 2004.
[98] TSMC 65nm Technology Platform, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company. [Online]. Available: http://www.tsmc.com
[99] A. Wang and A. Chandrakasan, “Energy efficient system partitioning for dis-
tributed wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. International Conference on Acoustics,
Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP), May 2001.
[100] A. Wang, W. B. Heinzelman, A. Sinha, and A. P. Chandrakasan, “Energy-scalable
protocols for battery-operated microsensor networks,” J. VLSI Signal Process.
Syst., vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 223–237, 2001.
[101] L. C. Washington, Elliptic Curves, Number Theory and Cryptography. London,
UK: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2003.
169
[102] L. Wei, Z. Chen, K. Roy, M. C. Johnson, Y. Ye, and V. K. De, “Design and opti-
mization of dual-threshold circuits for low-voltage low-power applications,” IEEE
Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 7, no. 1, pp.
16–24, Mar. 1999.
[103] S. B. Wicker, Error control systems for digital communication and storage.
Prentice-Hall, 1995.
[104] Y. Zhang, W. Liu, W. Lou, and Y. Fang, “Location-based compromise-tolerant se-
curity mechanisms for wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 247–260, Feb. 2006.
[105] Y. Zheng, “Digital signcryption or how to achieve cost(signature & encryption)
<< cost(signature) + cost(encryption),” in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’97,
ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1294. Springer, 1997, pp. 165–179.
170
